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Abstract
We introduce the problem of assigning resources to improve their utilization. The motivation
comes from settings where agents have uncertainty about their own values for using a resource,
and where it is in the interest of a group that resources be used and not wasted. Done in
the right way, improved utilization maximizes social welfare— balancing the utility of a high
value but unreliable agent with the group’s preference that resources be used. We introduce the
family of contingent payment mechanisms (CP), which may charge an agent contingent on use
(a penalty). A CP mechanism is parameterized by a maximum penalty, and has a dominant-
strategy equilibrium. Under a set of axiomatic properties, we establish welfare-optimality for
the special case CP(W ), with CP instantiated for a maximum penalty equal to societal value
W for utilization. CP(W ) is not dominated for expected welfare by any other mechanism,
and second, amongst mechanisms that always allocate the resource and have a simple indirect
structure, CP(W ) strictly dominates every other mechanism. The special case with no upper
bound on penalty, the contingent second-price mechanism, maximizes utilization. We extend
the mechanisms to assign multiple, heterogeneous resources, and present a simulation study of
the welfare properties of these mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Allocated resources often go to waste, even when in scarce supply. It is common in university
departments, for example, to find that all rooms are fully booked in advance, yet walking down the
corridor one sees that many rooms are in fact empty. For another university related example, one
of the authors of the present paper received the following email:
SITE VISIT: XXXXX Corporation
Date: Wednesday, January 17, 2018, 9:00am to 1:00pm
Location: XXXXXXX, XX
RESERVATIONS: Reservations are now open. Reserve your spot today!
COST: $15 fee to hold your reservation. There is no charge for the site-visit. You
will only be charged if you cancel within a week before the trip or do not show up
on the morning of the visit.
NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 25 spots
∗The authors thank Nick Arnosti, Yakov Babichenko, Ido Erev, Thibaut Horel, Scott Kominers, Debmalya Mandal,
Jake Marcinek, Di Pei, Ilya Segal, Moshe Tennenholtz, Rakesh Vohra, and seminar and workshop participants, for
helpful comments and discussions.
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Another example that we know about considers very costly, biolab equipment (costing as much
as $3M/yr to run), that is shared amongst four groups and that many students use. A problem
with the current, first-come first-served reservation system is that the equipment is always fully
booked, but frequently not used when the lab technician checks. For examples from other domains,
consider allocating spots in a spinning class to gym members, and assigning time slots for a public
electric vehicle charging station to residents in a neighborhood. Even a gym member who is highly
uncertain about being able or willing to attend the class, or a resident unsure about actually needing
to use the charging station, may reserve a space just in case this turns out to be convenient.
What is common to these problems is the presence of uncertainty, self-interest and down-stream
utilization decisions on the part of participants, together with the broader interest of a group (a
department, the corporation, or the citizens of a city) that a resource be used and not wasted:
utilization often has positive externalities beyond the immediate agents, e.g. there will be less air
pollution when electrical cars are charged and used; the planner might also be interested only in
the utilization of the resources, e.g. the firm benefiting from potentially attracting and hiring more
students if more showed up for the site visit.
We formalize the desire for utilization by introducing an additional welfare gain of W ≥ 0 when
a resource is used by the assigned agent, and adopt the design objective of maximizing expected
total welfare. The societal value W models either the positive externality on the society from
utilization, or the weight assigned to the planner while trading-off agents’ vs. planner’s welfare. In
the special case where W =∞, the goal becomes one of optimizing for the planner and maximizing
utilization— the probability that the resource is used.
Despite appearing important to practice and simple to state, this problem does not appear to
have been formally defined or studied in the literature. Collecting bids and running a second-price
(SP) auction need not assign a resource to a reliable agent (the agent with the highest expected
value for the option of using a resource need not be the one most likely to use the resource).
Moreover, the SP auction does not charge payments contingent on whether or not the resource is
used, and because of this misses the opportunity to “shape” incentives to use a resource once it
has been assigned. A penalty of $15 for not using a resource changes the calculus for an assigned
agent: now a rational agent will choose to use the resource as long as her realized value is greater
than -$15.
Beyond our opening examples, penalties for not using a resource are used by some hospitals
in charging patients for missing an appointment,1 by organizers of some conferences that charge a
deposit which is returned only to students that actually attended talks,2 and by some restaurants
who charge a fee if guests reserve but do not show up.3 These approaches can be viewed as simple,
first-come first-served schemes, and where it is not clear how the penalty should be set: a penalty
that is too small is not effective, whereas a penalty that is too big will drive away participation
in the scheme. We are not aware of any formal analysis of these kinds of mechanisms, or a design
approach that takes into account the maximum penalty that an individual participant would be
willing to face, which in fact is a very good signal for her reliability. This is the main conceptual
contribution of our paper.
1https://huhs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/HDS%20New%20Patient%20Welcome%20Letter.pdf, visited
May 10th, 2018.
2https://risingstarsasia2018.ust.hk/guidelines.php, visited May 10th, 2018.
3https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2018/feb/25/restaurants-turn-up-heat-on-no-show-diners,
visited May 10th, 2018.
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1.1 Our Results
We formalize the problem of designing mechanisms for improving resource utilization, and define
a family of two-period mechanisms that make use of payments that are contingent on whether or
not a resource is used. In our model, an agent’s private type corresponds to a distribution on her
future value for using the resource— this value models her utility from using the resource minus
the utility from her outside option, and as a result may be negative. In period zero, agents make
reports that communicate information about their type. A mechanism assigns the resource, and
may both collect a payment at this time as well as determine a penalty for the assigned agent in
the event the resource is not used. In period one, the assigned agent’s value is realized, and with
knowledge of the penalty the agent decides whether or not to use the resource.
We model the societal value for the resource being utilized as W ≥ 0, and take as the design
objective that of maximizing expected social welfare: the sum of the expected value to the assigned
agent and the expected value to society. In the special case that W = ∞ the design objective
is to maximize utilization. We insist on voluntary participation, and also the mechanism being
no-deficit, thus precluding charging very large penalties while also paying the agents a very large
reward to participate in the first place.4
We introduce the class of contingent payment mechanisms (CP), parameterized by a maximum
penalty Z. The CP mechanism has a simple, dominant-strategy equilibrium, where each agent
either bids on a base payment she always pays, if she is willing to accept Z as the no-show penalty,
or otherwise bids on the maximum penalty she is willing to accept (Theorem 1). The main results
establish the welfare-optimality of the CP mechanism when instantiated for a maximum penalty
equal to the societal value W for utilization, and under a set of axioms. First, we show that CP(W )
is not dominated for expected welfare by any other mechanism (Theorem 3). Second, we show that
amongst mechanisms that always allocate the resource and support a simple indirect structure,
CP(W ) optimizes social welfare profile by profile (Theorem 4). We formalize the simple indirect
structure as requiring that mechanisms have an ordered payment space, so that all agents agree on
which of any two pairs of (upfront, penalty) payments is more preferable. Such mechanisms simply
ask each agent for the maximum such (upfront, penalty) payment that she is willing to accept. As
a special case (Theorem 2), the societal welfare of CP(W ) dominates the SP auction. We need
a genericity assumption to state the main results, precluding ties under the mechanism. We can
dispense with this requirement in a direct-revelation analogue of the CP mechanism.
As an interesting, and we think practically-motivated special case, the contingent second-price
(CSP) mechanism (where the resource is assigned to the agent with the maximal willingness to pay
a penalty, and the penalty faced by that agent is the second-highest such bid) is the special case
of the CP mechanism with no upper bound on penalty. Based on this, we obtain as an immediate
corollary of Theorem 4 that CSP’s utilization strictly dominates that of all other mechanisms (under
the same assumptions). The CSP mechanism also has the appealing property that it never collects
a payment from an agent who uses the resource (Theorem 5 gives a uniqueness result for CSP
under this additional no-charge requirement).
We extend the mechanisms to the setting of multiple, heterogeneous resources (where each agent
gets at most one resource) in Section 5, and present simulation results in Section 6 to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our mechanisms, comparing with second-price auctions and other benchmarks.5
4Without the requirement of no-deficit, a simple second price auction for “the option to use a resource and also
get paid W when the resource is used” is welfare-optimal.
5For assigning multiple heterogeneous resources, the generalized CP mechanisms are dominant-strategy incentive-
compatible, however, the optimality results do not generalize, and we can construct examples to show that the VCG
mechanism can achieve better expected welfare or utilization. Still, simulation results demonstrate significantly better
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In particular, we show that a significant improvement in societal welfare can be achieved by the
CP mechanism (c.f., improvement in utilization for the CSP mechanism).
1.2 Related Work
Contingent payments have arisen in previous work on auction design. Prominent examples include
auctioning oil drilling licenses [16], royalties [6, 9], ad auctions [24], and selling a firm [12]. Unlike in
our model, payments are contingent on some observable world state (e.g. amount of oil produced,
a click, or the ex post cash flow) rather than an agent’s own downstream actions. Moreover, the
major role of contingent payments in these applications is to improve revenue as well as to hedge
risk [22]. In contrast, the role of penalties in our setting is two-fold: to provide participants with a
way to signal their own, idiosyncratic uncertainty, as well as to address problems of moral hazard
that arise once a resource has been assigned.
Our problem is a principal-agent problem [15, 17]. Classically, the principal-agency literature
addresses both problems with hidden information (e.g. seller’s quality [10]) before the time of
contracting, which are termed adverse selection, and problems for which information asymmetry
arises after the time of contracting (e.g. shipping a low quality good), the problem of moral hazard.
The distinction between the two settings is blurred in dynamic settings (see [23, 4]) such as the
present one. This is because there are informational asymmetries both before and after contracting.
In particular, although agents’ actions are fully observable, uncertainty together with participation
constraints precludes charging unbounded penalties, which is a standard approach when actions
are observable in moral hazard problems. We are not aware of any model or methods in the
principal-agency literature that addresses our problem.
In regard to auctions in which actions take place after the time of contracting, Atakan and
Ekmekci [2] study auctions where the value of taking each action depends on the collective actions
by others, but these actions are taken before rather than after observing the world state, and thus
the timing of information is quite different than in our model. A classical paper is Courty and
Li [8], who study the problem of revenue maximization in selling airline tickets, where passengers
have uncertainty about their value for a trip at the time of booking, and decide whether to take
a trip only after realizing their actual values. Although Courty and Li [8] model agents’ types as
distributions, and the optimal mechanism in their setting can be understood as a menu of contingent
contracts, the type spaces in their model are effectively one-dimensional, since they require the value
distributions to satisfy either stochastic dominance or the “mean preserving spread” condition. In
both cases, agents’ expected utility functions do not cross with each other. We do not impose such
constraints on the type space, and one of the major technical difficulties in te present work is the
heterogeneous preference of agents over different payment schedules.
The closest related work is on the design of mechanisms for incentivizing reliability in the
specific setting of demand-side response in electric power systems [18, 19], where selected agents
decide whether to respond only after uncertainty in their costs for demand response are resolved.
The objective there is to guarantee a probabilistic target on the collective actions taken by agents,
without selecting too large a number of agents or incurring too much of a total cost. Crucially, and
in stark contrast to the models in the present paper, there is no hard feasibility constraint in these
settings of demand response— that is, whereas only one agent can be assigned to a resource in our
model, in demand response problems any number of agents can reduce demand. This additional
feasible constraint has the effect of making the present problem more challenging.
Other papers study assignment problems under uncertainty, including models with the possi-
bility that workers assigned to tasks will prove to be unreliable [21], and general models of dynamic
performance on average.
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mechanism design, where the goal is to maximize expected total (discounted) value in the presence
of uncertainty [20, 5, 3] (dynamic VCG mechnanisms). What is different between these models
and our problem is that there is no need for the “shaping” of downstream behavior through con-
tingent payments. In Porter et al. [21], for example, the probability that an assigned worker fails
to complete a task is fixed. The solution suggested by dynamic VCG would be to simply run a
second-price auction with reserve −W in the second period (this auction would allow payments of
up to W to agents). This is outside our design space: we seek mechanisms that assign the resource
in a period before the value of agents are realized. We think this is important in the aforementioned
motivating settings, because it allows for planning by agents.
There is also a literature on strictly-proper scoring-rules [13], but this does not not appear to
helpful for eliciting the information about uncertainty in the present context because (i) only the
actions, and not realized values are observed, and thus a scoring-rule method could not be used to
elicit beliefs about value distributions, and (ii) the utility for using an assigned resource is entangled
with the incentives to provide accurate prediction about one’s utilization action.
2 Preliminaries
We first introduce the model for the assignment of a single resource. There is a set of agents
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and two time periods. In period T = 0, the value of each agent i ∈ N for using
the resources is uncertain, represented by a random variable Vi ∈ R, whose exact (and potentially
negative) value is not realized until period T = 1 (the time line is more formally presented in
the next subsection). The cumulative distribution function (CDF) Fi of Vi is agent i’s private
information at period 0, and corresponds to her type. Let F = (F1, . . . , Fn) denote a type profile.
The assignment is determined in period 0, whereas the allocated agent decides on whether to
use the resource at period 1, after she privately learns the realization vi of Vi. In addition, if the
resource is utilized, then society gains value W ≥ 0. Define V +i , max{Vi, 0}. We make the
following assumptions about Fi for each i ∈ N :
(A1) E
[
V +i
]
> 0, which means that Vi takes positive value with non-zero probability, thus the
option to use the resource as one wishes has positive value. An agent for which this is
violated would never be interested in the resource.
(A2) E
[
V +i
]
< +∞, which means that agents do not get infinite expected utility from the option
to use the resource, thus would not be willing to pay an underhandedly large payment for it.
Example 1 is a value distribution with discrete support, and models the type of an agent
who may be unable to use the resource. Example 2 is an example type model where values are
continuously distributed. Our results do not depend on any assumptions on continuity.
Example 1 ((wi, pi) model). w.The value for agent i to use the resource is wi > 0, however, she is
able to do so only with probability pi ∈ (0, 1). With probability 1−pi, agent i is unable to show up
to use the resource. This hard constraint can be modeled as Vi taking value −∞ with probability
1− pi. See Figure 1. We have E
[
V +i
]
= wipi > 0. If the resource is allocated to agent i, it will be
used with probability pi, and the expected social welfare is pi(wi +W ).
Example 2 (Exponential model). The utility for agent i to use the resource is a fixed value wi > 0
minus a random opportunity cost, which is exponentially distributed with parameter λi > 0. See
Figure 2. The expected value of the random value Vi is E [Vi] = wi − 1/λi, where 1/λi is the
expected value of the opportunity cost.
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Vi =
{
wi, w.p. pi
−∞, w.p. 1− pisome text v
fi(v)
pi
1− pi
wi−∞
Figure 1: Agent value distribution under the (wi, pi) type model.
fi(v) =
{
λie
λi(v−wi), v ≤ wi
0, v > wi
some text v
fi(v)
wi
λi
Figure 2: Agent value distribution under the exponential type model.
2.1 Two-Period Mechanisms
A two-period mechanism is defined byM = (R, x, t(0), t(1)). At period 0, each agent makes a report
ri from some set of messages R. Let r = (r1, . . . , rn) ∈ Rn denote a report profile. Based on the
reports, an allocation rule x = (x1, . . . , xn) : Rn → {0, 1}n assigns the right to use the resource to
at most one agent, which we denote as i∗, for whom xi∗(r) = 1. xi(r) = 0 for all i 6= i∗. Each agent
is charged t
(0)
i (r) in period 0. The mechanism also determines the penalty t
(1)
i∗ (r) for the allocated
agent (denote t
(1)
i (r) = 0 for all i 6= i∗).6 The timeline of a two-period mechanism is as follows:
Period 0:
• Each agent i ∈ N reports ri ∈ R to the mechanism based on the knowledge of her type Fi.
• The mechanism allocates the resource to agent i∗ ∈ N , thus xi∗(r) = 1 and xi(r) = 0 for i 6= i∗.
• The mechanism collects t(0)i (r) from each agent, and determines the penalty t(1)i∗ (r) for i∗.
Period 1:
• The allocated agent privately observes the realized value vi∗ of Vi∗ .
• The allocated agent decides whether to use the resource based on vi∗ and t(1)i∗ (r).
• The mechanism collects the penalty t(1)i∗ (r) from agent i∗ if she did not use the resource.
Example 3 (Second price auction). The standard second price (SP) auction can be described as
a two-period mechanism, where R = R, i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈N ri, t(0)i∗ (r) = maxi 6=i∗ ri, and all other
payments are 0. The second price auction does not make use of the period 1 payments.
Example 4 (Contingent second price mechanism). The contingent second price (CSP) mechanism
collects a single bid from each agent, allocates the right to use resource to the highest bidder, and
charges the second highest bid, but only if the allocated agent fails to use the resource. Formally,
R = R, i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈N ri, t(1)i∗ (r) = maxi 6=i∗ ri, and all other payments are 0.
We assume that agents are risk-neutral, expected-utility maximizers with quasi-linear utility
functions. Assume agent i is allocated the resource and is facing a two part payment (z, y), where z is
6More generally, we may think of mechanisms that charge the allocated agent a non-zero payment in period 1
even if she used the resource. Without temporal preference for money, it is without loss to move this part of the
payment to period 0, and at the same time subtract the same amount from the penalty payment.
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the period 1 penalty payment and y is the period 0 base payment. Her utility from using the resource
in period 1 is vi−y, and her utility from not using the resource is −y−z. Therefore, after observing
vi in period 1, the rational decision is to use the resource if and only if vi − y ≥ −y − z ⇔ vi ≥ −z
(breaking ties in favor of using the resource). Define ui(z) as
ui(z) , E [Vi1{Vi ≥ −z}]− zP [Vi < −z] = E [max{Vi,−z}] , (1)
where 1{·} is the indicator function, we know that the expected utility of an allocated agent facing
two-part payment (z, y) is u(z) − y. Under a two-period mechanism, given report profile r, agent
i’s expected utility is therefore xi(r)ui(t
(1)
i (r))− t(0)i (r).
Throughout the paper, we assume that agents make rational decisions in period 1, if allocated.
The interesting question is in agents’ incentives regarding their reports in period 0. For any vector
s = (s1, . . . , sn) and any i ∈ N , we denote s−i , (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn).
Definition 1 (Dominant strategy equilibrium). A two-period mechanism has a dominant strategy
equilibrium (DSE) if for each agent i ∈ N , for any type Fi satisfying (A1) and (A2), there exists a
report r∗i ∈ R such that ∀ri ∈ R, ∀r−i ∈ Rn−1,
xi(r
∗
i , r−i)ui(t
(1)
i (r
∗
i , r−i))− t(0)i (r∗i , r−i) ≥ xi(ri, r−i)ui(t(1)i (ri, r−i))− t(0)i (ri, r−i).
Let r∗(F ) = (r∗1, . . . , r∗n) denote the report profile under a DSE given type profile F .
Definition 2 (Individual rationality). A two-period mechanism is individually rational (IR) if for
each agent ∀i ∈ N , for any type Fi satisfying (A1) and (A2), and any report profile r−i ∈ Rn−1,
xi(r
∗
i , r−i)ui(t
(1)
i (r
∗
i , r−i))− t(0)i (r∗i , r−i) ≥ 0.
IR requires that an agent’s expected utility is non-negative under her dominant strategy given
that she makes rational decisions in period 1 (if allocated), regardless of the reports made by the
rest of the agents. IR is based on the expected utility before uncertainty is resolved. It is still
possible for an agent to get negative utility at the end of period 1. We cannot charge unallocated
agents without violating IR, thus t
(0)
i (r) ≤ 0 for all i 6= i∗ for all r ∈ Rn.
The expected revenue of a two-period mechanism M is the total expected payment from the
agents to the mechanism in DSE, assuming rational decisions of agents in period 1:
revM(F ) ,
∑
i∈N
t
(0)
i (r
∗) + t(1)i∗ (r
∗) · P
[
Vi∗ < −t(1)i∗ (r∗)
]
. (2)
Definition 3 (No deficit). A two-period mechanism satisfies no deficit (ND) if, for any type profile
F that satisfies (A1) and (A2), the expected revenue is non-negative: revM(F ) ≥ 0.
We also consider two additional properties: A mechanism is anonymous if the outcome (assign-
ment, payments) is invariant to permuting the identities of agents. A mechanism is deterministic
if the outcome is not randomized unless there is a tie.
The utilization achieved by mechanism M in dominant strategy is the probability with which
the allocated agent rationally decides to use the resource:
utM(F ) , P
[
Vi∗ ≥ −t(1)i∗ (r∗)
]
. (3)
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The expected welfare gain to society from the resource being utilized is therefore utM(F )W ,
and the expected social welfare is the sum of this welfare gain, and the expected value of the agent
from using this resource:
swM(F ) , E
[
Vi∗1{Vi∗ ≥ −t(1)i∗ (r∗)}
]
+WutM(F ). (4)
Our objective is to design mechanisms that maximize expected social welfare. We do not
consider monetary transfers in the social welfare function. The reason t
(1)
i (r
∗) appears is that it
affects the decision of the allocated agent in period 1.
3 Contingent Payment Mechanism
We introduce in this section a class of contingent payment mechanisms parametrized by a maximum
penalty Z an agent may be charged in period 1, and show that under (A1) and (A2), the contingent
payment mechanism with Z = W achieves higher welfare and utilization than the second price
auction in dominant strategy equilibrium. The uniqueness and optimality are discussed in Section 4.
Definition 4 (Contingent payment mechanism). The contingent payment mechanism with max-
imum penalty Z (the CP(Z) mechanism) collects two-part bids b = (b1, . . . , bn). For each i ∈ N ,
bi = (b
(1)
i , b
(0)
i ) ∈ R, where R = {(z, y) ∈ R2 | 0 ≤ z ≤ Z, y = 0} ∪ {(z, y) ∈ R2 | z = Z, y ≥ 0}.
• Allocation rule: xi∗(b) = 1 for i∗ ∈ arg maxi∈N{b(0)i + b(1)i } (breaking ties at random).
• Payment rule: let i′ ∈ arg maxi 6=i∗{b(0)i + b(1)i }. t(0)i∗ (b) = b(0)i′ ; t(1)i∗ (b) = b(1)i′ ; t(0)i (b) = 0, ∀i 6= i∗.
Under the CP(Z) mechanism, each agent may bid a period 0 payment if she is willing to bid
a period 1 no-show penalty of Z, in which case bi = (Z, b
(0)
i ) for some b
(0) ≥ 0. Otherwise, she
may bid a maximum acceptable penalty (up to Z) and no period 0 payment, i.e. bi = (b
(1)
i , 0)
for some b
(1)
i ∈ [0, Z]. The resource is allocated to the highest period 0 payment bidder, if there
exist any agent with non-zero b(0) bid (since b
(1)
i ≤ Z thus b(1)i + 0 ≤ b(0)i + Z). Otherwise, the
resource is allocated to the highest period 1 penalty bidder. The allocated agent is charged a two
part payment equal to the bid of the second “highest” bidder.
Recall that ui(z) = E [max{Vi,−z}] as defined in (1) is the expected utility of agent i if she were
allocated and charged only a penalty z— in period 1, the agent gets either her realized value vi,
or get −z from paying the penalty, whichever is higher. ui(z), as a result, is also the highest base
payment agent i is willing to accept, when her penalty is z. We first state some useful properties.
Lemma 1. Assuming (A2), the expected utility ui(z) as a function of the penalty z satisfies:
(i) ui(0) = E
[
V +i
]
, limz→+∞ ui(z) = E [Vi].
(ii) ui(z) is continuous, convex and monotonically decreasing with respect to z.
See Figure 3. The proof of this lemma is straightforward. For part (i), ui(0) = E[V +i ] by
definition, and limz→∞ E [ui(z)] = E [Vi] holds by the monotone convergence theorem. Part (ii)
holds since max{Vi,−z} is monotonically non-increasing in z, continuous, and convex, so ui(z)
inherits these properties. Intuitively, when z = 0, the agent uses the resource if and only if her
realized value is non-negative thus gets expected utility E[V +i ]. As the penalty z increases, the
agent’s expected utility continuously decreases. When z = ∞, the agent always uses the resource
and never pays the penalty thus her expected utility converges to E [V ].
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zui(z)
Z
E[V +i ]
ui(Z)
z0i
(a) ui(Z) ≥ 0
z
ui(z)
E[V +i ]
z0i Z
(b) ui(Z) < 0
Figure 3: Expected utility for being allocated the resource as a function of penalty z.
Theorem 1 (Dominant Strategy in CP(Z)). Given (A1)-(A2), under the CP(Z) mechanism, it is
a dominant strategy for each agent i ∈ N to bid b∗i,CP = (Z, ui(Z)) if ui(Z) ≥ 0. Otherwise, it is a
dominant strategy to bid b∗i,CP = (z
0
i , 0), where z
0
i is the unique zero-crossing of ui(z).
Proof. First, observe that the message space R is effectively one-dimensional. For any pair of bids
(b
(1)
i , b
(0)
i ), (b˜
(1)
i , b˜
(0)
i ) ∈ R, denote (b(1)i , b(0)i )  (b˜(1)i , b˜(0)i ) if b(1)i + b(0)i ≥ b˜(1)i + b˜(0)i . For any type
Fi satisfying (A1) and (A2), the agent’s expected utility is weakly lower for a higher payment, i.e.
b
(1)
i + b
(0)
i ≥ b˜(1)i + b˜(0)i ⇒ ui(b(1)i )− b(0)i ≤ ui(b˜(1)i )− b˜(0)i .
We now show that for any agent, her utility at the two-part bid b∗i,CP is exactly zero. If ui(Z) ≥ 0,
the agent gets expected utility ui(Z)− ui(Z) = 0 if she is charged b∗i,CP = (Z, ui(Z)). If ui(Z) < 0,
the continuity, convexity and monotonicity of ui(z) (part (ii) of Lemma 1) implies that there is a
unique zero crossing z0i < Z of ui(z) s.t. ui(z
0
i ) = 0. If she is charged b
∗
i,CP = (z
0
i , 0), her expected
utility is then ui(z
0
i ) − 0 = 0. This implies that the bids b∗i,CP is an agent’s “highest acceptable
payment” in the message space R. The argument for DSE is then standard, observing that the
mechanism allocates to the highest bidder and charges a second highest bid.
Intuitively, under the CP(Z) mechanism, it is a dominant strategy for each agent to bid the
additional amount she is willing to pay at period 0, given a period 1 penalty Z, otherwise, the
dominant strategy is to bid her highest acceptable penalty when there is no period 0 payment.
When Z = 0, the CP(Z) mechanism reduces to SP, where it is a dominant strategy to bid b∗i,SP =
ui(0) = E[V +i ]. When Z → +∞, and with the additional assumption,
(A3) E [Vi] < 0, meaning that being forced to always use the resource is not favorable,
then CP(Z) reduces to the CSP mechanism, where it is a dominant strategy to bid the largest
acceptable penalty z0i , the unique zero crossing of ui(z) (see Figure 3). z
0
i exists and is unique
given (A3), since ui(z) is continuous, monotonically decreasing in z, and converges to E [Vi] < 0.7
3.1 Better Welfare and Utilization than Second Price Auction
The following lemma states useful properties of utilization and welfare as functions of penalty z.
Lemma 2. Assuming (A1) and (A2), when agent i is allocated and charged a two part payment
(z, y), the utilization and social welfare are independent of the base payment y, and satisfy:
(i) the utilization uti(z) = P [Vi ≥ −z] is right continuous and monotonically non-decreasing in
z. Moreover, uti(z) = 1 + u
′
i(z+), where u
′
i(z+) is right derivative of ui at z.
7(A3) should not be confused with (A1), which means that the value of the option to use the resource is E
[
V +i
]
> 0.
(A3) only requires that an agent gets negative expected utility from committing to always use the resource, regardless
of what happens. This a very natural assumption: without (A3), an agent would accept any unboundedly large penalty
for the right to use a resource.
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Figure 4: Economies where the SP winner is different from the CP(W ) winner.
(ii) the social welfare swi(z) = E [Vi1{Vi ≥ −z}]+WP [Vi ≥ −z] is right continuous, monotonically
non-decreasing in z when z ≤W , and monotonically non-increasing in z when z > W .
See Appendix B.1 for the proof. The continuity and monotonicity of uti(z) is obvious. From
Fubini’s theorem, we get ui(z) = E[V +i ]−
∫ z
0 Fi(−v)dv when z ≥ 0 and ui(z) = −z+
∫∞
−z P [Vi ≥ v] dv
when z < 0. By the fundamental theorem of calculus, the right derivative of ui(z) is equal to the
right limit of −Fi(−v) at z, which is P [Vi ≥ −z]− 1. For part (ii), observe that swi(z) = swi(z) =
E [(Vi +W )1{Vi ≥ −z}], and that the random variable Vi +W is non-negative iff Vi ≥ −W .
Intuitively, the agent uses the resource with higher probability when the penalty z increases.
This, in turn, results in a smaller probability of paying the penalty, thus ui(z) decreases slower as
z increases, corresponding to a shallower slope of the convex function ui(z). The welfare-optimal
utilization decision in period 1 is to use the resource iff the realized value vi ≥ −W , therefore
z = W optimizes swi(z). With Lemma 2, we prove the following result:
Lemma 3. Let u1(z) and u2(z) be the expected utilities of two agents whose types satisfy (A1)
and (A2), and consider z1, z2 ∈ R s.t. z1 < z2. If u1(z1) ≥ u2(z1), and u1(z2) ≤ u2(z2), we have:
(i) ut1(z1) ≤ ut2(z2).
(ii) sw1(z1) ≤ sw2(z2) if z1 ≤ z2 ≤W , and sw1(z1) ≥ sw2(z2) if W ≤ z1 ≤ z2.
When u2(z) crosses u1(z) from below, u1(z2)−u1(z1) ≤ u2(z2)−u2(z1). The convexity of ui(z)
then implies that the right derivative of u2(z) at z2 must be higher than the right derivative of
u1(z) at z1, hence the inequality on utilization. See Appendix B.2 for details, and the proof for part
(ii). The CP mechanism with the maximum penalty set to W will have some very nice optimality
properties. As a preliminary observation, we state the following result relative to the SP auction.
Theorem 2. For any set of agent types satisfying (A1)-(A2), under the dominant strategy equilib-
ria, the CP(W ) mechanism mechanism Pareto-dominates the SP auction in utilization and welfare.
Proof. Consider the following two cases:
Case 1. SP and CP(W ) allocate the resource to the same agent. Assume that CP(W ) charges
penalty z∗, we know z∗ ∈ [0,W ]. The utilization and welfare under CP(W ) are always (weakly)
higher than those under SP, given the monotonicity properties proved in Lemma 2.
Case 2. SP and CP(W ) allocate the resource to agent 1 and 2 respectively. We know that for agent
2 to be allocated under CP(W ), either u1(W ) ≥ 0, in which case W = min{z01 ,W} and u2(W ) ≥
u1(W ) (Figure 4a), or u1(W ) < 0, in which case z
0
1 = min{z01 ,W} and u2(z01) ≥ u1(z01) (Figure 4b).
In both cases, u2(min{z01 ,W}) ≥ u1(min{z01 ,W}) holds, and we have z∗ ∈ [min{z01 ,W},W ], where
z∗ is the penalty that agent 2 is charged under CP(W ). Given that agent 1 is the SP winner we
also know that u1(0) ≥ u2(0). Applying Lemma 3, we know ut2(z∗) ≥ ut2(min{z01 ,W}) ≥ ut1(0)
and sw2(z
∗) ≥ sw2(min{z01 ,W}) ≥ sw1(0), i.e. CP(W ) achieves better welfare and utilization.
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Figure 5: Agents’ value distributions and expected utilities in Example 5.
This domination result holds for arbitrary tie-breaking rules for the two mechanisms if W > 0.
The same analysis on the CSP mechanism shows that it always achieves a higher utilization than
the second price auction. We illustrate through the following examples the improvement in welfare
and utilization from CP(W ) over SP, and show that SP can be arbitrarily worse than CP(W ).
Example 5 (Double gain in CP(W )). Consider W = 50, and two agents with value distributions
and expected utility functions as shown in Figure 5. Compared with agent 2, agent 1 has higher
value for the resource, but lower probability of willing to use the resource and higher probability
for a hard constraint. Under SP, the DSE bids are b∗1,SP = 20, b
∗
2,SP = 16 thus agent 1 is allocated.
The utilization is ut1(0) = P [V1 ≥ 0] = 0.2 and the welfare is sw1(0) = 100 ∗ 0.2 + 50 ∗ 0.2 = 30.
Whereas under CP(W ) mechanism, b∗1,CP = (z
0
1 , 0) = (30, 0) and b
∗
2,CP = (W,u2(W )) = (50, 2).
Agent 2 is allocated and charged penalty t
(1)
2 (b) = z
0
1 = 30, thus the utilization is P [V2 ≥ −30] = 0.8,
and the welfare is sw2(30) = 40 ∗ 0.4− 10 ∗ 0.4 + 50 ∗ 0.8 = 52. Note that the these are higher than
ut2(0) = P [V2 ≥ 0] = 0.4 and sw2(0) = 36, what is achieved if agent 2 is allocated the resource
under SP in some other economy and charged no penalty.
Example 6 (SP arbitrarily worse). Under the (wi, pi) model introduced in Example 1, the expected
utility for agent i given penalty z is ui(z) = wipi− (1−pi)z. Consider an economy with two (wi, pi)
agents: p1 = ε, w1 = 1/ε, and p2 = 1 − ε, w2 = 1 for some very small ε > 0. Agent 1 is allocated
under SP since b∗1,SP = 1 > b
∗
2,SP = 1 − ε, whereas agent 2 is allocated under CP(W ) as long as
W > 1, since z01 = 1/(1− ε) ≈ 1 and z02 = (1− ε)/ε 1. The utilization under SP and CP(W ) are
ε and 1−ε, respectively, and the welfare under the two mechanisms are 1+εW and (1−ε)(1+W ).
Thus, CP(W ) can have arbitrarily better utilization and welfare by selecting a better winner.
The higher welfare and utilization achieved by the CP(W ) come from two aspects of its design.
First, charging a penalty z ∈ [0,W ] changes the period 1 decision of the allocated agent, promoting
the resource to be used more efficiently. Second, the CP(W ) mechanism selects a better winner:
• For i s.t. ui(W ) ≥ 0, the two-part bids under CP(W ) add up to ui(W ) +W = E [Vi1{Vi ≥W}]
−WP [Vi < −W ] + W = E [(Vi +W )1{Vi ≥ −W}] = swi(W ), the highest achievable welfare
from allocating the resource to agent i and setting an optimal penalty z = W . As a result, if
maxi∈N{b(0)i + b(1)i } ≥W , CP(W ) selects the agent with highest achievable welfare.
• When W is large and ui(W ) < 0, agents with higher probabilities of showing up have ui(z) that
decrease more slowly with z, thus have relatively higher zero crossing z0i , and are more likely to
be allocated. With large W , higher utilization is more likely to generate higher social welfare.
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Figure 6: Iso-profit curves, IR and ND ranges in the two-dimensional payment space.
4 Characterization and Optimality of CP
In this section, we study the optimal mechanism design problem with the following properties:8
P1. Dominant-strategy equilibrium
P2. Individually rational
P3. No deficit
P4. Anonymous
P5. Deterministic (unless breaking ties)
P6. No payment to unassigned agents
Recall that while facing a two part payment (z, y), an agent’s expected utility is ui(z)− y. We
work with iso-profit curves in the two dimensional payment space, which are sets of (z, y) pairs for
which ui(z)−y = α for some constant α, i.e. an agent will be indifferent to all payments (z, y) that
reside on the same iso-profit curve. See Figure 6a. The zero-profit curve (i.e. where α = 0, the solid
line depicted in Figure 6a) is characterized by y = ui(z), thus is continuous, convex, monotonically
decreasing (Lemma 1). Other iso-profit curves are vertical shifts of the zero-profit curve, and recall
from Lemma 2 that the utilization for an agent facing payments (z, y) relates to the slope of the
zero-profit curve: uti(z) = u
′
i(z+).
An agent gets negative expected utility if she is allocated and charged a payment (z, y) above
her zero-profit curve. We call the area in the (z, y) space weakly below an agent’s zero-profit curve
the IR-range for the agent. For any (z, y), the expected revenue (e.g. payment from the agent to
the mechanism) is revi(z, y) = y + z · P [Vi < −z]. We call the set of (z, y) for which revi(z, y) ≥ 0
the ND-range (no-deficit range) for this agent.
Example 7. Consider the (wi, pi) model (Example 1). The zero-profit curve is characterized by
y = wipi−(1−pi)z. The expected revenue of the mechanism is revi(z, y) = y+(1−pi)z, thus the ND
range is lower-bounded by y = −(1−pi)z. See Figure 6b(i). For an agent with an exponential value
distribution as in Example 2, the zero-profit curve, IR and ND ranges are as shown in Figure 6b(ii)
(see derivations in Appendix A).
Under any two-period mechanism that is IR and ND, the payment facing the assigned agent
must reside in the intersection of the IR and ND ranges of the assigned agent. Given the mono-
tonicity properties in Lemma 2, the highest possible utilization for an agent subject to IR and
ND constraints, i.e. the first-best utilization, is achieved by charging a two-part payment with the
highest penalty z within the intersection of IR and ND ranges. The first first best social welfare
8For (P5) deterministic, we require that the outcome is deterministic unless multiple agents make the same reports,
and that when breaking ties, the two-part payment each agent may be charged if allocated is still deterministic. We
also assume that the mechanism uses minimum tie-breaking, and satisfies the positive responsiveness requirement,
i.e. if a tied agent was to make a “strictly higher” report in an otherwise equivalent economy, then she has to be
allocated with probability one in this other economy. See Appendix B.4.
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is achieved by charging the agent a penalty z = W , or by charging the agent the highest penalty
within the intersection of IR and ND ranges (if penalty z = W is outside this intersection). See
Proposition 1 in Appendix B.3.
To illustrate this for the exponential type, the first-best utilization is achieved by charging
(zB, yB) at point B in Figure 6b(ii). This also achieves the first best welfare if W ≥ zB, otherwise,
the first best welfare is achieved by charging (W, y) for some y ∈ [−(1 − uti(W ))W,ui(W )]. For
the (wi, pi) type, although there is no upper bound on the highest IR and ND penalty, as long as
z ≥ −wi, we have uti(z) = pi and swi(z) = wipi +Wpi, which are not affected by the penalty z.
4.1 Optimality of CP
Define the frontier of a set of agents N with type profile F = (F1, . . . , Fn) to be the upper-
envelope of the zero-profit curves of all agents, i.e. for all z ∈ R, uN (z) , maxi∈N ui(z). This
characterizes the maximum willingness to pay (as base payment, given penalty z) by all agents
in N . As the upper envelope of a finite set of continuous, convex, and monotonically decreasing
functions, uN (z) has the same properties. When (A3) is satisfied by all agents, uN (z) also has a
unique zero-crossing, which we denote as z0N . Define the frontier of the sub-economy without agent
i as uN\{i}(z) , maxj 6=i uj(z), and the mth frontier of the economy as the mth upper envelope of
{ui(z)}i∈N . See Figure 7.
We first characterize the possible outcomes for any two-period mechanism satisfying (P1)-(P6)
in the following two lemmas. This characterization is crucial for our main technical results.
Lemma 4. Assume that the type space includes all value distributions satisfying (A1)-(A3), and
consider a two-period mechanism that satisfies (P1)-(P6). For any type profile F , the allocated
agent i∗ and the two-part payment (z∗, y∗) agent i∗ is charged satisfy:
(i) (z∗, y∗) resides weakly below ui∗(z).
(ii) (z∗, y∗) resides weakly above the frontier of the rest of the economy uN\{i∗}(z).
(iii) The allocated agent faces a non-negative base payment y∗ ≥ 0.
Instead of requiring the type space to include all value distributions satisfying (A1)-(A3), the
lemma also holds assuming that the type space is the set of all (wi, pi) types. We defer the full
proof to Appendix B.4, giving intuition here. Part (i) is implied by IR. If (ii) is violated, i.e. there
exists agent i 6= i∗ s.t. ui(z∗) − y∗ > 0, then in the economy where the type of agent i∗ is also
given by Fi, pretending that her type is Fi∗ is a useful deviation. We show this by proving that any
agent who is tied with some other agent cannot get strictly positive utility. Part (iii) is proved by
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showing that if the allocated agent is charged y∗ < 0 in some economy, we can replace the agent’s
type with some (wi, pi) type, in which case either IC or ND is violated.
Given (P4) anonymity, regardless of whether there are ties in agents’ reports, there is a two-
part payment (z∗, y∗) a mechanism charges its allocated agent(s). Lemma 4 implies that (z∗, y∗)
is in between the first and second frontiers and above the horizontal axis y = 0 (see Figure 7),
and that the allocated agent(s) resides on the frontier at z∗ (i.e. uN (z∗) = ui∗(z∗) if agent i∗ is
allocated). The following lemma proves monotonicity properties w.r.t. the penalty z∗, on utilization
and welfare achieved by mechanisms that satisfy (P1)-(P6), for any fixed economy.
Lemma 5. Fix any type profile F satisfying (A1) and (A2). Among all mechanisms that satisfy
(P1)-(P6), the utilization achieved by a mechanism is (weakly) higher if it charges its allocated
agent(s) a higher penalty z∗. Similarly, the achieved welfare is monotonically increasing in z∗ when
z∗ ≤W , and monotonically decreasing in z∗ when z∗ > W .
The proof is provided in Appendix B.5, which uses the monotonicity properties in Lemmas 2
and 3 and the characterization in Lemma 4. An important implication of this lemma is that the
highest possible welfare achievable by any mechanism under (P1)-(P6) is achieved by charging
a penalty z∗ = W if maxi∈N ui(W ) ≥ 0 and z∗ = maxi∈N z0i otherwise. Lemma 4 then requires
allocating to agent(s) in arg maxi∈N ui(z∗), which is in fact the set of agents allocated under CP(W ).
Therefore, the only ways to achieve an even higher welfare than the CP(W ) mechanism are (i)
break ties in favor of higher welfare instead of at random, and (ii) charge a higher penalty, when
the CP(W ) penalty determined by the the second highest bid is lower than optimal z∗.
Definition 5 (Generic input). A type profile F satisfies the generic input property if for any
i, j ∈ N , i 6= j: (i) ui(W ) 6= uj(W ), if ui(W ), uj(W ) ≥ 0, and (ii) z0i 6= z0j , if ui(W ), uj(W ) < 0.
A type profile is generic if no two agents have the same period 0 willingness to pay given penalty
W , or the same maximum acceptable penalty that is below W . As a result, there would not be
any tie under the CP(W ) mechanism.9 An immediate result is that the CP mechanism is welfare
optimal for the (wi, pi) type space with the generic input assumption. This is easy to see, since in
this type domain, a higher penalty does not improve utilization, or induce more welfare-optimal
time 1 utilization decision of the allocated agent.
Corollary 1. Assume the type space is the set of all (wi, pi) value distributions. With the generic
input assumption, the CP(W ) mechanism is welfare-optimal type profile by type profile among all
two-period mechanisms that satisfy (P1)-(P6).
We also have the following result, the first of our two main results. Theorem 3 states that the
CP(W ) mechanism is not dominated in welfare by any two-period mechanism under (P1)-(P6).
Theorem 3. Assume the type space is the set of all value distributions satisfying (A1) and (A2).
With the generic input assumption, no two-period mechanism under (P1)-(P6) achieves weakly
higher social welfare than the CP(W ) mechanism for all type profiles, and a strictly higher social
welfare than the CP(W ) mechanism for at least one type profile.
See Appendix B.6 for the proof. Intuitively, if a mechanismM under (P1)-(P6) always achieves
weakly higher welfare than the CP(W ) mechanism, lemmas 4 and 5 require that it always allocates
9 The generic inputs assumption is only needed for the indirect, CP(W ) mechanism. A direct revelation version,
that always breaks ties in favor of the agent with higher utilization, has all the performance guarantees stated in
Corollary 1 and Theorems 3 and 4 without the generic input assumption.
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Figure 8: Ordered payment spaces for various two-period mechanisms.
the resource to the winner under CP(W ). We then show a violation of either IR or DSE, ifM ever
charges the a higher penalty than the CP(W ) mechanism does to improve welfare.
A payment space P of a mechanism is the set of two-part payments that’s achievable by some
report profile of the agents: P = {(t(1)i∗ (r), t(0)i∗ (r)) | r ∈ Rn}.
Definition 6 (Ordered payment space). A payment space P ⊆ R2 is ordered if all agents with
types satisfying (A1) and (A2) agree on which one of any two pairs of payments is more preferable.
Formally, ∀(z, y) ∈ P, ∀(z˜, y˜) ∈ P, for all F1, F2 under (A1) and (A2),
u1(z)− y > u1(z˜)− y˜ ⇒ u2(z)− y ≥ u2(z˜)− y˜.
The second main result is that the CP(W ) mechanism is welfare-optimal profile by profile among
a large class of mechanisms that always allocate the resource, and use an ordered payment space.
Theorem 4. Assume the type space is the set of all value distributions satisfying (A1) and (A2).
With the generic input assumption, the CP(W ) mechanism is welfare-optimal type profile by type
profile, among all two-period mechanisms that satisfy (P1)-(P6), always allocate the resource, and
use an ordered payment space.
We defer the full proof to Appendix B.6. Intuitively, if a mechanism achieves a higher welfare by
charging a penalty larger than the penalty determined the CP(W ) mechanism, we may construct an
alternative economy, and show that guaranteeing (P1)-(P6) results in a violation of the assumption
that the payment space is ordered.
In fact, all mechanisms discussed so far use ordered payment spaces. The second price auction
always charges no penalty and a non-negative base payment, thus PSP = {(z, y) ∈ R2 | z = 0, y ≥
0}, as illustrated in Figure 8a. Similarly, PCSP = {(z, y) ∈ R2 | z ≥ 0, y = 0}, as in Figure 8b. The
CP(Z) mechanism sets payments PCP(Z) = {(z, y) ∈ R2 | 0 ≤ z ≤ Z, y = 0} ∪ {(z, y) ∈ R2 | z =
Z, y ≥ 0}, as illustrated in Figure 8c. We may consider other mechanisms, for example, a SP+Z
mechanism collects a single non-negative bid from each agent, allocates to the highest bidder (if
there is any), charges a time 1 penalty Z, and the second highest bid as the base payment (no base
payment if only one agent submitted non-negative bid). The payment space is given in Figure 8d.
We may also consider a γ-CSP mechanism, which collects a single bid from each agent, allocates
to the highest bidder, charges a γ fraction of the second highest bid as the time 0 base payment,
and the rest of it as the no-show penalty. The payment space is as shown in Figure 8e.
In addition, mechanisms with an ordered payment space support a simple indirect message
structure: the interpretation is that the mechanism asks an agent to report the largest payment
in the ordering that is acceptable. Given this, dominant-strategy mechanisms can be achieved by
allocating to the agent with the highest report and charging the second-highest report (defined
with respect to the payment order).
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4.2 Uniqueness and Optimality of CSP
The CSP mechanism can be considered as a special case of the CP(W ) mechanism with no upper
bound on the penalty an agent may be charged. Recognizing this, and defining generic input as no
ties in agents’ zero-crossings, we can obtain the following optimality results for utilization, analo-
gous to the optimality results of CP(W ) presented in the previous section. Under the additional
assumption of no-charge when using the resource, we can state a uniqueness result for CSP.
Theorem 5. Assume the type space is the set of all value distributions satisfying (A1)-(A3), assume
generic input, and consider only two-period mechanisms that satisfy (P1)-(P6):
(i) the CSP mechanism is the unique mechanism that always allocates the resource, and does not
charge the allocated agent if the resource is utilized (i.e. “no-charge”).
(ii) for the (wi, pi) type space, the CSP mechanism is optimal for utilization, profile by profile.
(iii) the CSP mechanism is not dominated for utilization by any mechanism.
(iv) the CSP mechanism is utilization optimal profile by profile, among all mechanisms that always
allocate the resource and use an ordered payment space.
The proofs are similar to the proofs of the optimality results in the previous section, observing
that the only way to achieve a higher utilization than CSP is to allocate the resource to the CSP
winner, and charge the CSP winner a strictly higher penalty than the second highest bid. See
Appendix B.7 for a proof of this theorem.
5 Assignment of Multiple Resources
In this section, we generalize the model and mechanisms for assigning multiple resources, but where
each agent remains interested in receiving at most one resource (i.e., the unit-demand model). Let
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents and M = {a, b, . . . ,m} be the set of m resources. For each
a ∈ M , the value for each agent i to use resource a is a random variable Vi,a with CDF Fi,a.
{Fi,a}a∈M corresponds to agent i’s type, and we assume that the random values are independent.
The SP auction can be generalized as the VCG mechanism [25, 7, 14], where it is a dominant
strategy for agent i to bid ui,a(0) = E[V +i,a] for resource a. The naive generalization of the CP(Z)
mechanism (which assigns the resources to maximize the sum of the two-part bids, and charges
each agent the externality that she imposes on the rest of the economy in terms of the two-part
bids) fails to be incentive compatible. This is because agents’ expected utilities are not quasi-linear
in the period 1 penalty payments.
A set of two-part payments {(za, ya)}a∈M is a set of competitive equilibrium (CE) price if when
each agent selects her favorite resource given these payments, no resource is selected more than
once, and a resource that is not selected has zero prices za = ya = 0. Recall that in the message
space of a CP(Z) mechanism, a two-part payment (z, y) is “higher” if it has a larger sum z+y, and
that an agent has a lower expected utility if she is charged a higher two-part bid. We generalize
the CP(Z) mechanism as the minimum CE price mechanism [1, 11]:
Definition 7 (Generalized CP(Z) mechanism). The generalized CP mechanism parametrized by
maximal penalty Z (the GCP(Z) mechanism) collects value distributions {Fi,a}i∈N,a∈M from the
agents, and computes the minimum CE payments {(za, ya)}a∈M in the payment spaceR = {(z, y) ∈
R2 | 0 ≤ z ≤ Z, y = 0} ∪ {(z, y) ∈ R2 | z = Z, y ≥ 0}.
• Allocation rule: for each agent i ∈ N , if maxa∈M ui,a(za) − ya ≥ 0, then xi(F ) = a∗i ∈
arg maxa∈M ui,a(za)− ya (breaking ties to clear the market).
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• Payment rule: charge each agent t(1)i (F ) = za∗i and t
(0)
i (F ) = ya∗i if agent i is allocated resource
a∗i . All other payments are zero.
For the case where the m resources are identical, the mechanism reduces to the (m+ 1)th price
version of the CP(Z) mechanism. Intuitively, each agent is assigned one of her favorite resources
given the prices {(za, ya)}a∈M , if she can afford any. When Z = 0, the mechanism reduces to VCG,
and for the case when Z =∞, we get the generalized CSP (GCSP) mechanism, which prices each
resource at the minimum CE penalties. Demange and Gale [11] prove that the minimum CE price
mechanism is incentive compatible, and Alaei et al. [1] provide a recursive algorithm to compute
these minimum CE prices.
Theorem 6. Given assumptions (A1)-(A2), under the generalized CP(Z) and the generalized CSP
mechanisms, it is a dominant strategy for each agent to truthfully report her type.
Unlike the assignment of a single resource, the welfare and utilization under the generalized
CP mechanisms need not dominate that of the VCG mechanism. Still, simulation results in Sec-
tion 6 show that the generalized CP mechanism achieves significantly higher average welfare and
utilization than VCG.
6 Simulation Results
In this section, we compare the welfare and utilization achieved by different mechanisms for assign-
ing a single resource, or multiple heterogeneous resources.
We adopt the natural exponential type model (see Example 2), under which agent i’s value for
using resource a is Vi,a = wi,a−Oi,a, where wi,a > 0 is the fixed value from using the resource, and
Oi,a ∼ Exp(λi,a) is the exponentially distributed opportunity cost. E [Vi,a] = wi,a − λ−1i,a where λ−1i,a
is the expected value of the opportunity cost. We consider the type distribution where the value and
the expected opportunity cost λ−1i,a are uniformly distributed: λ
−1
i,a ∼ U[0, L] and wi,a ∼ U[0, λ−1i,a ].
With wi,a < λ
−1
i,a , (A1)-(A3) are satisfied.
6.1 Single Resource Assignment
We first study the assignment of a single resource. We set L = 10 and W = 5, corresponding to
scenario where the societal value W is equal to the expected opportunity cost for an average agent to
use a resource.10 Varying the number of agents from 2 to 15, we compute the average social welfare
and utilization over 10,000 randomly generated profiles under the CP(W ), CSP, SP mechanisms,
and other benchmarks. See Figure 9. The First-Best benchmark is the highest achievable welfare
and utilization, subject to the assumptions of IR and no deficit (ND), i.e. the expected total
revenue of the mechanism has to be non-negative. The Random benchmark assigns the resource
at random to one of the agents without charging any payment, modeling the first-come-first-serve
system of reserving the resource.
Figure 9a shows that the CP(W ) mechanism achieves slightly higher welfare than the CSP
mechanism, and is very close to the first-best welfare assuming IR and ND. Both CP(W ) and CSP
achieve better social welfare than the SP auction. The average utilization under the mechanisms
are shown in Figure 9b. In comparison to the SP auction, both CSP and CP(W ) mechanisms
achieve significantly higher utilization.11
10 Appendix C presents additional results for settings where the societal preference for utilization is weaker/stronger.
11As the number of agents increases, the CP(W ) mechanism approaches the first-best welfare, whereas it is curious
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Figure 9: Social welfare and utilization for a single resource.
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Figure 10: Welfare and utilization for 3 heterogeneous resources, with small societal value W = 5.
6.2 Assigning Multiple Heterogeneous Resources
1 We now compare the social welfare and utilization (expected number of utilized resources) for
assigning 3 heterogeneous resources, as the number of agents varies from 2 to 15. Figure 10a
shows the average welfare and utilization achieved by different mechanisms and benchmarks, for
the scenario where W = 5 is equal to the expected opportunity cost for an agent to use a resource.
The First Come First Serve (FCFS) benchmark allows each agent to choose her favorite remaining
resource as they arrive in a random order, and does not charge any payments. The generalized
CP(W ) and generalized CSP mechanisms achieve better welfare and significantly better utilization
than the VCG mechanism.
We also present results when the society has weaker or stronger preference for utilization.
Figure 11 shows the average welfare and utilization, when the societal value from utilization is
W = 0. Both the generalized CP(0) mechanism and the VCG mechanism achieve the first-best
welfare, whereas the generalized CSP mechanism is less efficient but achieves a higher utilization.
Figure 12 shows the average welfare and utilization for three resources, when the societal value
from utilization is W = 10. We can see that with a stronger desire for the resource being utilized,
the generalized CP mechanism and the generalized CSP mechanism significantly outperform the
that there remains a gap to the first-best utilization for CSP. With sufficient competition, the under CP(W ) is the
agent that achieves the first-best welfare, and moreover, CP(W ) determines the optimal penalty W . In contrast, the
CSP winner may not be the one that achieves the first-best utilization, and the second-highest bid remains lower
than the optimal (first-best) penalty.
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Figure 11: Welfare and utilization for 3 heterogeneous resources, with small societal value W = 0.
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Figure 12: Welfare and utilization for 3 heterogeneous resources, with small societal value W = 10.
VCG mechanism on both welfare and utilization. With a large number of agents, the achieved
welfare is in fact close to the first-best benchmark under the IR and ND assumptions.
7 Conclusion
We study the problem of resource assignment where agents have uncertainty about their values
and where it is in the interest of the mechanism designer that resources be used and not wasted.
We introduce the contingent payment mechanisms parametrized by maximum penalty Z, and show
that among mechanisms with a set of natural axiomatic properties, the CP(W ) mechanism is not
dominated, and is welfare optimal among mechanisms that always allocate the resource and support
an especially simple indirect structure. We prove similar optimality results for the contingent second
price mechanism for utilization, extend the results to the assignment of multiple, identical items,
and show that the mechanisms can also be generalized to assign multiple heterogeneous resources.
Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our mechanisms.
An interesting direction for future work is to generalize the model to allow for more than two
time periods, where agents may arrive asynchronously, uncertainty unfolds gradually over time, and
resources can be re-allocated. It would also be interesting to fold in considerations from behavioral
economics, understanding how these contingent mechanisms interact with present-biased agents.
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Appendix
Derivation of expected utility functions and DSE bids for various type models are provided in
Appendix A. We provide in Appendix B the proofs that are omitted from the body of the paper.
Additional simulation results and discussions are presented in Appendix C.
A Utilities and DSE Bids under Different Type Models
A.1 The (wi, pi) Model
Recall that for the (wi, pi) type model introduced in Example 1, the distribution of an agent’s
random value is given by
Vi =
{
wi w.p. pi
−∞ w.p. 1− pi
for some wi > 0 and pi ∈ (0, 1). The CDF of Vi is
Fi(v) =
{
1− pi for v < wi
1 for v ≥ wi .
The expected utility of an agent, when allocated and charged a two-part payment (z, y), is
ui(z)− y =
{
wipi − (1− pi)z − y, for z ≥ −wi
−z − y, for z < −wi .
This is because when z is negative, the agent uses the resource if she is able to only if wi ≥ −z. If
wi < −z, the agent would decides to never use the resource, and always pays −z in period 1. The
DSE bids under the different mechanisms are:
• For the SP auction: b∗i,SP = ui(0) = wipi
• For the CSP mechanism: b∗i,CSP = z0i = wipi/(1− pi).
• For the CP(Z) mechanism: b∗i,CP = (b(1)i , b(0)i ), where
• if z0i ≥ Z: b(1)i = Z and b(0)i = u(Z) = wipi − Z(1− pi), and
• if z0i < Z: b(1)i = z0i = wipi/(1− pi) and b(0)i = 0.
When an agent with (wi, pi) type is assigned the resource and charged a penalty z ≥ −wi, the
utilization is uti(z) = pi, and the welfare is pi(wi+W ). This is the first-best welfare and utilization
that is achievable from allocating the resource to a (wi, pi) type agent, since the penalty does not
incentivize the agent to use the resource more or less often.
A.2 The Exponential Model
Consider the exponential model introduced in Example 2, where the random value for an agent to
use the resource is equal to a fixed value wi > 0 minus an opportunity cost Oi that is exponentially
distributed with parameter λi:
Vi = wi −Oi, where Oi ∼ Exp(λi)
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The CDF and PDF of the random value are
Fi(v) =
{
eλi(v−wi), for v ≤ wi
1, for v > wi
, fi(v) =
{
λie
λi(v−wi), for v ≤ wi
0, for v > wi
.
Note that the highest value an agent may get from using the resource is wi. When charged a two
part payment (z, y) with z < −wi, the agent is paid a positive amount that is larger than wi for not
using the resource, thus the agent never uses the resource, and gets expected utility ui(z) = −z−y.
When z ≥ −wi, the agent’s expected utility as a function of the two-part payments is
ui(z)− y =
∫ wi
−z
vλie
λi(v−wi)dv − ze−λi(z+wi) − y = wi + 1
λi
(
e−λi(wi+z) − 1
)
− y.
The DSE bids under the different mechanisms are:
• For the SP auction: b∗i,SP = ui(0) = wi + 1λi
(
e−λiwi − 1).
• For the CSP mechanism: b∗i,CSP = z0i = −wi − 1λi log(1− wiλi).
• For the CP(Z) mechanism: b∗i,CP = (b(1)i , b(0)i ), where
• if z0i ≥ Z: b(1)i = Z and b(0)i = ui(Z) = wi + 1λi
(
e−λi(wi+Z) − 1), and
• if z0i < Z: b(1)i = z0i = −wi − 1λi log(1− wiλi) and b
(0)
i = 0.
An agent’s utilization as the function of the no-show penalty is of the form:
uti(z) =
{
0, for z < −wi
1− e−λi(wi+z), for z ≥ −wi ,
and the expected revenue of the mechanism is revi(z, y) = z·e−λi(wi+z)+y. Setting ui(z) = revi(z, 0)
(i.e. solving for the crossing point of the zero-profit curve and the zero-revenue curve, as illustrated
in Figure 6b(ii)), we get the highest possible penalty that a mechanism can charge an agent with
exponentially type as:
zFBi = −
1
λi
− 1
λi
Ω
(
k, e−1+wiλi(−1 + wiλi)
)
.
Here, Ω(·) is the omega function (which is also called the Lambert W function), the inverse function
of y = xex. The Ω function is multivalued. We take the lower branch with k = −1, since when
taking k = 0, Ω
(
k, e−1+wiλi(−1 + wiλi)
)
= −1 + wiλi ⇒ zFBi = −w, which is not the highest
possible penalty that we are looking for. Plugging zFBi into the utilization function uti(z), we can
obtain the first-best utilization that is achievable by a mechanism that satisfies IR and No Deficit.
When an agent with exponential type is charged a penalty z ≥ −wi, the achieved social welfare
is swi(z) = wi + (e
−λi(wi+z)(1 + λiz) − 1)/λi + W (1 − e−λi(z+wi)). For the first best welfare, if
zFBi ≥W , we can set z = W , we achieve the first-best welfare of
swFBi =wi + (e
−λi(wi+W )(1 + λiW )− 1)/λi +W (1− e−λi(W+wi))
=wi +W + (e
−λi(wi+W ) − 1)/λi.
When zFBi < W , the first best welfare is simply swi(z
FB
i ).
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B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. Assuming (A1) and (A2), when agent i is allocated and charged a two part payment
(z, y), the utilization and social welfare are independent of the base payment y, and satisfy:
(i) the utilization uti(z) = P [Vi ≥ −z] is right continuous and monotonically non-decreasing in
z. Moreover, uti(z) = 1 + u
′
i(z+), where u
′
i(z+) is right derivative of ui at z.
(ii) the social welfare swi(z) = E [Vi1{Vi ≥ −z}]+WP [Vi ≥ −z] is right continuous, monotonically
non-decreasing in z when z ≤W , and monotonically non-increasing in z when z > W .
Proof. We first prove part (i) of the lemma.
Part (i). As is outlined in the body of the paper, what is left to prove is P [Vi ≥ −z] = 1 + u′i(z+).
Denote V −i , −min{Vi, 0}, we know that Vi = V +i − V −i , and that both V +i and V −i are non-
negative random variables. First consider the case when z ≥ 0, for which the expected utility
function can be rewritten as
ui(z) = E [max{Vi,−z}] = E
[
V +i −min{V −i , z}
]
= E
[
V +i
]− E [min{V −i , z}] .
Observing min{V −i , z} =
∫ z
0 1{V −i ≥ v}dv, and applying Fubini’s theorem, we get
E
[
min{V −i , z}
]
= E
[∫ z
0
1{V −i ≥ v}dv
]
=
∫ z
0
E
[
1{V −i ≥ v}
]
dv =
∫ z
0
P
[
V −i ≥ v
]
dv.
Therefore,
ui(z) = E
[
V +i
]− ∫ z
0
P
[
V −i ≥ v
]
dv = E
[
V +i
]− ∫ z
0
P
[−V −i ≤ −v] dv = E [V +i ]− ∫ z
0
F (−v)dv.
From the fundamental theorem of calculus, the right derivative is equal to the right limit of the
integrand, thus
u′i(z+) = − limv→z+F (−v) = − limv→(−z)−F (v) = −P [Vi < −z] = P [Vi ≥ −z]− 1.
We now consider the case where z < 0. The expected utility ui(z) can be rewritten as
ui(z) =E [max{Vi,−z}] =
∫ ∞
0
P [max{Vi,−z} ≥ v] dv = −z +
∫ ∞
−z
P [Vi ≥ v] dv.
Taking the right derivative, we again get u′i(z+) = −1 + P [Vi ≥ −z].
Part (ii). For any z1, z2 such that z1 ≤ z2 ≤W , −z2 ≤ Vi < −z1 ⇒ Vi +W ≥ 0, thus we know
swi(z1)− swi(z2) =E [(Vi +W ) · 1{Vi ≥ −z1}]− E [(Vi +W ) · 1{Vi ≥ −z2}]
=− E [(Vi +W ) · 1{−z2 ≤ Vi < −z1}] ≤ 0.
Therefore sw(z2) ≥ sw(z1), and swi(z) is monotonically non-decreasing in this range. Similarly,
for any z1, z2 such that W ≤ z1 ≤ z2, −z2 ≤ Vi < −z1 ⇒ Vi +W ≤ 0, thus
swi(z1)− swi(z2) =E [(Vi +W ) · 1{Vi ≥ −z1}]− E [(Vi +W ) · 1{Vi ≥ −z2}]
=− E [(Vi +W ) · 1{−z2 ≤ Vi < −z1}] ≥ 0.
This completes the proof of this lemma.
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. Let u1(z) and u2(z) be the expected utilities of two agents whose types satisfy (A1)
and (A2), and consider z1, z2 ∈ R s.t. z1 < z2. If u1(z1) ≥ u2(z1), and u1(z2) ≤ u2(z2), we have:
(i) ut1(z1) ≤ ut2(z2).
(ii) sw1(z1) ≤ sw2(z2) if z1 ≤ z2 ≤W , and sw1(z1) ≥ sw2(z2) if W ≤ z1 ≤ z2.
Proof. For part (i), we know from part (i) of Lemma 2 that u′i(z+) = uti(z)− 1. Therefore:
u1(z2)− u1(z1) ≤ u2(z2)− u2(z1)
⇒
∫ z2
z1
(ut1(v)− 1)dv ≤
∫ z2
z1
(ut2(v)− 1)dv
⇒
∫ z2
z1
ut1(v)dv ≤
∫ z2
z1
ut2(v)dv
Since ut1(z) and ut2(z) are both non-negative and monotonically non-decreasing in z, we have:
(z2 − z1) · ut1(z1) ≤
∫ z2
z1
ut1(v)dv ≤
∫ z2
z1
ut2(v)dv ≤ (z2 − z1) · ut2(z2).
Which implies ut2(z2) ≥ ut1(z1). For part (ii), first observe that
swi(z) = E [(Vi +W )1{Vi ≥ −z}] = ui(z) + z(1− uti(z)) +Wuti(z).
When z1 ≤ z2 ≤W , given u2(z2) ≥ u1(z2), uti(z) = u′i(z+) + 1 and the convexity of u1(z),
sw2(z2)− sw1(z1)
=u2(z2) + z2(1− ut2(z2)) +Wut2(z2)− (u1(z1) + z1(1− ut1(z1)) +Wut1(z1))
≥u1(z2)− u1(z1) + z2 − z1 − z2ut2(z2) + z1ut1(z1) +W (ut2(z2)− ut1(z1))
=
∫ z2
z1
(ut1(z)− 1)dz + z2 − z1 − z2ut2(z2) + z1ut1(z1) +W (ut2(z2)− ut1(z1))
≥
∫ z2
z1
ut1(z1)dz − z2ut2(z2) + z1ut1(z1) +W (ut2(z2)− ut1(z1))
=ut1(z1)(z2 − z1)− z2ut2(z2) + z1ut1(z1) +W (ut2(z2)− ut1(z1))
=(W − z2)(ut2(z2)− ut1(z1)) ≥ 0.
When W ≤ z1 ≤ z2, we have:
sw2(z2)− sw1(z1)
=u2(z2) + z2(1− ut2(z2)) +Wut2(z2)− (u1(z1) + z1(1− ut1(z1)) +Wut1(z1))
≤u2(z2)− u2(z1) + z2 − z1 − z2ut2(z2) + z1ut1(z1) +W (ut2(z2)− ut1(z1))
=
∫ z2
z1
(ut2(z)− 1)dz + z2 − z1 − z2ut2(z2) + z1ut1(z1) +W (ut2(z2)− ut1(z1))
≤
∫ z2
z1
ut2(z2)dz − z2ut2(z2) + z1ut1(z1) +W (ut2(z2)− ut1(z1))
=ut2(z2)(z2 − z1)− z2ut2(z2) + z1ut1(z1) +W (ut2(z2)− ut1(z1))
=(W − z1)(ut2(z2)− ut1(z1)) ≤ 0.
This completes the proof of this lemma.
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B.3 The First Best Social Welfare
Proposition 1 (First Best Welfare). For any agent i with type Fi satisfying (A1)-(A2), the first
best social welfare subject to IR and ND constraints is either achieved by charging a penalty z = W ,
or by charging the highest penalty within the intersection of her IR and ND ranges.
Proof. From the monotonicity properties proved in Lemma 2, we know that if there exists y ∈ R
s.t. ui(z) − y ≥ 0 and rev i(z, y) ≥ 0, meaning that the intersection of the agent’s IR and ND
ranges include (W, y) for some y ∈ R, then the first best social welfare is achieved by charging the
agent such a two-part payment where the penalty is z = W . What is left to consider is the case
where the intersection of the IR and ND range does not include penalty z = W . We show that if
the intersection of the IR and ND ranges includes some (z, y), then for any z′ ∈ [0, z], there exists
y′ ∈ R s.t. (z′, y′) is also in the intersection of the IR and ND ranges. This implies that when
z = W is not included, then the highest achievable welfare must be achieved by the highest penalty
in the intersection. Note that given ui(z)− y ≥ 0 and rev i(z, y) ≥ 0, we have
ui(z)− y + rev i(z, y) = E [Vi1{Vi ≥ −z}] ≥ 0.
From the monotonicity of E [Vi1{Vi ≥ −z}], we know that for any z′ ∈ [0, z], ui(z′)−y′+rev i(z′, y′) =
E [Vi1{Vi ≥ −z′}] ≥ 0 holds for any y′ ∈ R, and as a result, it is possible to find y′ s.t. ui(z′)−y′ ≥ 0
and rev i(z
′, y′) ≥ 0 both hold.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Before proving the lemma, we first provide a few useful results. The first result proves some more
properties of the expected utility function ui(z): for any type that satisfies (A1) and (A2), ui(z)
always resides above −z, and converges to −z as z → −∞.
Lemma 6. Assuming (A1) and (A2), the expected utility ui(z) as a function of penalty z satisfies:
(i) ui(z) + z is non-negative, and is monotonically non-decreasing in z.
(ii) limz→−∞ ui(z) + z = 0.
Proof. Define gi(z) , ui(z) + z, we know that gi(z) is continuous and convex. For part (i), the
non-negativity gi(z) ≥ 0 holds, since ui(z) = E [max{Vi,−z}] ≥ −z. The monotonicity holds, since
Lemma 2 implies that the right derivative of gi(z) is given by g
′
i(z+) = u
′
i(z+) + 1 = uti(z) =
P [Vi ≥ −z], which is non-negative for all z ∈ R. Part (ii) can now be rewritten as limz→−∞ gi(z) =
0. Given the non-negativity and the monotonicity of gi(z), we know that if part (ii) does not
hold, then there exists some ε > 0, s.t. gi(z) ≥ ε for all z ∈ R. We show that this results in a
contradiction.
First, note that for any z < 0, gi(z) = E [max{Vi,−z}] + z = E
[
max{V +i ,−z}
]
+ z. Given
assumption (A2), we know that E
[
V +i
]
is finite. This implies that limz→−∞ E
[
min{V +i ,−z}
]
=
E
[
V +i
]
(from monotone convergence theorem), and that for the positive constant ε/2 > 0, there
exists a large constant X ∈ R≥0 s.t. ∀z < −X, E
[
min{V +i ,−z}
] ≥ E [V +i ] − ε/2. This is a
contradiction, since for any z < −X, we have E [V +i ] = E [max{V +i ,−z}] + E [min{V +i ,−z}] −
(−z) = ui(z) + z + E
[
min{V +i ,−z}
] ≥ ε+ E [V +i ]− ε/2 = E [V +i ]+ ε/2⇒ ε ≤ 0.
This completes the proof of this lemma.
The following lemma shows that there exist valid agent types satisfying (A1)-(A2) that corre-
spond to expected utility functions with certain properties.
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Lemma 7. For any function u : R→ R that is continuous, convex, monotonically decreasing, and
satisfies limz→−∞ u(z) + z = 0 and u(0) > 0, there exists a random variable V with CDF F such
that F satisfies (A1) and (A2), and that u(z) = E [max{V,−z}] for all z ∈ R. Moreover, F also
satisfies (A3) if limz→+∞ u(z) < 0.
Proof. We prove this lemma by constructing an agent type F from u(z), and showing that it has
the desired properties. Given that u is convex, we know that it is semi-differentiable. Let F be
defined as F (v) = −u′((−v)−), i.e. the negation of the left derivative of u at −v. We show that
F is a valid CDF that satisfies (A1), (A2), and for a random variable V with distribution F ,
u(z) = E [max{V,−z}] holds for all z ∈ R.
We first show that F is a valid cumulative distribution function, i.e. F (v) is monotonically
increasing, right-continuous, lower bounded by 0 and upper bounded by 1. The monotonicity
is obvious, since u is convex, thus u′(v−) is non-decreasing in v, thus −u′((−v)′−) is also non-
decreasing in v. The right continuity of F is implied by the left-continuity of u′(v−), and u′(v−)
is left-continuous since the left derivative of convex function is monotone and cannot have jump
discontinuities. u being non-increasing implies that u′(v) ≤ 0 for all v ∈ R thus F (v) ≥ 0 for all
v ∈ R. Finally, if F (v) > 1 for some v ∈ R, we know that u′((−v)−) < −1 holds for some v, and as
a result of the convexity of u, u(z) + z must diverge as z → −∞, which contradicts the assumption
that limz→−∞ u(z) + z = 0.
We now show that the type F satisfies (A1) and (A2), i.e. E [V +] > 0 and E [V +] < +∞. Since
V + is a non-negative random variable where P [V + ≤ v] = F (v) for all v ≥ 0, we have
E
[
V +
]
=
∫ +∞
0
(1− P [V + ≤ v])dv = ∫ +∞
0
(1− F (v))dv =
∫ +∞
0
(1 + u′((−v)−))dv
Define g(v) , u(−v) for all v ∈ R, we know that g′(v+) = −u′((−v)−), therefore∫ +∞
0
(1 + u′((−v)−))dv = lim
z→+∞
∫ z
0
(1 + u′((−v)−))dv = lim
z→+∞
∫ z
0
(1− g′(v+))dv
= lim
z→+∞ z − g(z) + g(0) = limz→+∞ z − u(−z) + u(0) = u(0)− limz→−∞(u(z) + z) = u(0),
which implies that E [V +] = u(0) > 0 and is finite. What is left to prove is u(z) = E [max{V,−z}].
This is obvious, since u(z) as a function has the same right derivative as the right derivative of
E [max{V,−z}] w.r.t. z, and we had just shown above that the two functions coincide at z = 0.
Now assume that limz→+∞ u(z) < 0. We know that there exists z ∈ R s.t. u(z) < 0. As a
result, E [V ] ≤ E [max{V,−z}] = u(z) < 0 ⇒ E [V ] < 0, thus (A3) is satisfied. This completes the
proof of this lemma.
We now formally define first order stochastic dominance and positive responsiveness.
Definition 8 (First order stochastic dominance). Let F1 and F2 be two value distributions. F1
first-order stochastic dominates F2, which we denote F1 FOSD F2, if F1(v) ≤ F2(v) for all v ∈ R
and F1(v) < F2(v) for some v ∈ R. The dominance is strict if F1(v) < F2(v) for all v ∈ R s.t.
F1(v) < 1 and F2(v) > 0, in which case we denote F1 FOSD F2.
Definition 9 (Positive Responsiveness). A two-period mechanism with DSE r∗ is positively re-
sponsive (PR) if for any economy F , and each agent i, agent i getting allocated with probability
q ∈ (0, 1) under the DSE implies that if her type was F ′i s.t. F ′i FOSD Fi, then reporting r∗(F ′i ),
she gets allocated with probability one.
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Figure 13: Illustrations for the proof of lemma 8.
Intuitively, the PR condition requires that if an agent is allocated with some positive probability
that is less than one, then if she instead has a strictly “higher” type in terms of FOSD, then she
will get allocated with probability under the DSE of the mechanism.
The following lemma proves that when an agent is allocated with probability less than one,
then she cannot get strictly positive utilities.
Lemma 8. Assume that the type space includes all value distributions satisfying (A1)-(A3). Under
any two-period mechanism that satisfies (P1)-(P6) and under the DSE, agents who are allocated
with probability less than one get zero expected utilities. This result still holds if the type space is
the set of all (wi, pi) types.
Proof. Given assumption (P2) IR and (P6) no payment to unassigned agents, we know that agents
who gets assigned with probability zero gets zero expected utilities. Now assume toward a contra-
diction, that there exists a mechanism that satisfies (P1)-(P6) and an economy F , where there exists
an agent i ∈ N who gets positive expected utility, but is only allocated with probability qi ∈ (0, 1).
In the events that she is allocated, denote zi , t(1)i (r∗(F )) as her penalty and yi , t
(0)
i (r
∗(F ))
as her base payment. Agent i getting positive utility requires that qi(ui(zi) − yi) = pi for some
pi > 0, i.e. payment (zi, yi) resides on the curve ui(zi) − pi/qi. See Figure 13a. We first show a
contradiction for general types that satisfy (A1)-(A3), then for the (wi, pi) types.
Step 1. General types under (A1)-(A3). We first construct the expected utility function ui′(z) as
shown in the dashed line in Figure 13a. First, let ε be defined as ε , min
{
ui(0)
2 ,
pi
2qi
}
, we know
ε > 0. Moreover, let β be defined as β , εqi/pi (therefore ε = βpi/qi holds), we know that there are
two cases: when ui(0) ≥ pi/qi (as shown in Figure 13a), we have β = 1/2, and when ui(0) < pi/qi,
in which case β < 1/2. Now, define τ as the point where ui(z)− ε and the y = −z cross each other,
i.e.
τ , inf{z ∈ R | ui(z) ≥ −z + ε}, (5)
we show that τ exists and is finite. We know from part (ii) of Lemma 6 that the set {z ∈ R | ui(z) ≥
−z + ε} is bounded from below, since ui(z) + z approaches zero as z → −∞. We also know that
{z ∈ R | ui(z) ≥ −z + ε} is not empty, since ε ≤ ui(0)/2, therefore ui(0) > −0 + ε, which implies
0 ∈ {z ∈ R | ui(z) ≥ −z+ε}. Therefore, the infimum τ is finite, and we know from the monotonicity
and continuity of ui(z) + z that ui(τ) + τ = ε, and that τ < 0. Moreover, u
′
i(τ+) > −1 must hold,
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since otherwise we must have ui(τ) = −τ in order not to violate Lemma 6. Now we need to consider
two cases, depending on whether τ < zi holds.
Case 1: τ < zi. We first consider the case where τ < zi, as shown in Figure 13a. Define α as
α , min
{
3
4
,
(
1
2
+
1
2qi
)
β
}
,
we know α > β and α < β/qi, since 1/qi > 1. Moreover, define δ as
δ = min{δ1, δ2, δ3}, where δ1 = −ui(0)
4τ
, δ2 =
(α− β)pi/qi
zi − τ , and δ3 = u
′
i(τ+) + 1,
we know δ is strictly positive. Now, define the utility function ui′(z) as the following:
ui′(z) =
{ −z, if z < τ
ui(z)− ε− δ(z − τ), if z ≥ τ , (6)
we know that
ui′(0) = ui(0)− ε+ δτ ≥ ui(0)− ui(0)/2− ui(0)/4 = ui(0)/4 > 0.
Moreover, it is easy to check that ui′(z) is continuous, convex, monotonically decreasing, and
satisfies limz→−∞ ui′(z) + z = 0. Lemma 7 then implies that ui′(z) is the expected utility of some
agent whose type satisfies (A1) and (A2). Let’s denote the CDF as Fi′ and the random value of this
agent as Vi′ . Assuming that (A3) is satisfied by Fi, we know limz→∞ ui′(z) < limz→∞ ui(z) < 0,
thus Fi′ also satisfies (A3). It is also easy to show that Fi FOSC Fi′ , since for all v > −τ ,
Fi′(v) = −u′i′((−v)−) = 1, which is strictly greater than Fi(v) if Fi(v) < 1, and for all v ≤ −τ , we
have Fi′(v) = −u′i′((−v)−) = −(u′i((−v)−)− δ) = Fi(v) + δ > Fi(v).
Given the construction of ui′(z), we can also check that
ui′(zi)− yi = ui(zi)− yi − ε− δ(zi − τ) ≥ pi
qi
− β pi
qi
− (α− β) pi
qi
= (1− α) pi
qi
> 0.
As a result, in the economy where agent i is replaced by agent i′ with type Fi′ , if agent i′ pretends
that her type is actually Fi and reports r
∗
i (Fi), we know that she is allocated with probability qi,
charged zi as penalty and yi as her base payment if allocated, thus her expected utility would be
qi(ui′(zi)− yi) = (1− α)pi > 0.
Therefore, in the economy (Fi′ , F−i), agent i′ must get expected utility at least (1−α)pi — otherwise,
pretending to have type Fi would be a useful deviation. We also know that agent i
′ cannot be tied
with any other agent, since if she is tied, i.e. getting allocated with some positive probability that’s
smaller than one, then positive responsiveness requires that agent i to be allocated with probability
1 in the economy (Fi, F−i), which contradicts the assumption that agent i is tied with some other
agent. Let zi′ , t(1)i′ (Fi′ , F−i) and yi′ , t
(0)
i′ (Fi′ , F−i), we know that ui′(zi′) ≥ yi′ + (1− α)pi holds.
Now consider two cases: (i) zi′ < τ , and (ii) zi′ ≥ τ . When zi′ < τ , we know that agent i′ never
uses the resource (since P [Vi′ ≥ −zi′ ] = 0). As a result, the agent getting expected utility at least
(1−α)pi means that in expectation the mechanism pays the agent (1−α)pi > 0, which violates ND.
For case (ii), we know by construction that ui(zi′) ≥ ui′(zi′) + ε holds, therefore, in the original
economy, if agent i pretends that her type is in fact Fi′ , she gets expected utility:
ui(zi′)− yi′ ≥ ui′(zi′) + ε− yi′ ≥ (1− α)pi + β pi
qi
> pi.
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Figure 14: Illustration for the proof of Lemma 9 admissible payments.
The last inequality holds since α < β/qi by construction. This means that pretending to be of type
Fi′ is a useful deviation for agent i, therefore violating (P1) DSE. Since neither of (i) or (ii) can
hold, this is a contradiction, and completes the proof for Case 1 τ < zi.
Case 2: τ ≥ zi. For the case where τ ≥ zi, define ui′(z) in the same way as in (6), but for
δ , (u′i(τ+) + 1)/2. We can similarly show that ui′(z) as constructed is the utility function
corresponding to a valid agent type Fi′ satisfying (A1)-(A3) which is strictly first-order stochastic
dominated by Fi. Note that ui′(z) ≥ ui(z) − ε holds for all z ≤ τ . In the original economy,
replacing i with i′, we know that if agent i′ pretends to have type Fi, her expected utility is at
least qi(u
′
i(zi)− yi) ≥ qi(ui(zi)− ε− yi) ≥ pi− εqi ≥ pi/2 > 0. Therefore, in the economy (Fi′ , F−i),
agent i′ must be allocated the resource with probability one and get utility at least pi−εqi, in order
not to violate DSE and positive-responsiveness. Moreover, similar to the above case, the payment
she is charged (zi′ , yi′) has to satisfy zi′ ≥ τ in order not to violate ND. Now, if agent i gets the
outcome of agent i′ instead, her utility will be
ui(zi′)− yi′ ≥ ui′(zi′) + ε− yi′ ≥ pi − qiε+ ε > pi,
and this is a useful deviation for agent i. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2. (wi, pi) types. To complete the proof of this theorem, what is left to show is that when agent
i’s type follows the (wi, pi) model, then the constructed type Fi′ in the two cases in Step 1 also follows
the (wi, pi) model. This obvious, since assuming that P [Vi = wi] = pi and P [Vi = −∞] = 1−pi, the
random variable Vi′ corresponding to the expected utility function ui′(z) (see Figure 13b) satisfies
Vi′ = −τ with probability pi − δ > 0, and Vi′ = −∞ with probability 1− pi + δ.
The last lemma characterizes the range of admissible two-part payments for any two-period
mechanism that satisfies (P1)-(P6).
Lemma 9 (Admissible payments). Assume the type space includes all (wi, pi) types, and fix any
two-period mechanism that satisfies (P1)-(P6). For any type profile F , the two-part payment
(z∗, y∗) that the allocated agent i∗ is charged satisfy: (i) y∗ ≥ 0, and (ii) y∗ ≥ −z∗.
Proof. Consider an agent i∗ who is allocated with probability qi∗ > 0, and is charged (z∗, y∗) when
allocated. Agent i∗’s expected utility is qi∗(ui∗(z∗)− y∗).
Part (i): y∗ ≥ 0. Assume towards a contradiction, that there exists an economy, where the allocated
agent i∗ is charged a two part payment (z∗, y∗) where the base payment y∗ < 0. First, z∗ > 0 must
hold: for the case where qi∗ < 1, i.e. when agent i
∗ is tied with some other agent, Lemma 8 implies
that qi∗(ui(z
∗) − y∗) = 0, and this can only be the case if z∗ > 0; for the case where qi∗ = 1, if
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z∗ ≤ 0, the expected revenue of the mechanism is negative and this violates ND. Therefore, we
have a situation as shown in Figure 14a, where the solid line depicts the zero-profit curve of agent
i∗, and the dot indicates the two-part payment in the two-dimensional payment space.
Now consider a new agent i′ with random value Vi′ that follows the (wi, pi) type model, where
the parameters are given by
pi′ = max
{
1 +
(
1
4
qi∗ +
1
2
)
y∗
z∗
, 1/2
}
,
wi′ =− 1
pi′
qi∗
4
y∗
Since y∗ < 0 and z∗ > 0, we know that pi′ ∈ [1/2, 1), and that wi′ > 0, thus this is a valid agent type.
For any z ≥ 0, the expected utility function of agent i′ is given by ui′(z) = wi′pi′ − z(1− pi′), thus
the zero-profit curve of agent i′ is the dashed line in Figure 14a. Note that given this construction,
wi′pi′ = −qi∗y∗/4. Also note that (z∗, y∗) is below the agent’s budget balance curve rev i′(z, y) = 0
(the dotted line): rev i′(z
∗, y∗) = y∗+z∗(1−pi′) ≤ y∗+z∗(1−(1+(14qi∗+ 12)y
∗
z∗ )) = (1/2−qi∗/4)y∗ < 0.
Now consider the economy, where the reports of the rest of the agents are fixed, however, the
type of agent i∗ is replaced with agent i′. We know that if agent i′ got the outcome of agent i∗, her
expected utility is going to be:
qi∗(ui′(z
∗)− y∗) =qi∗(wi′pi′ − (1− pi′)z∗ − y∗)
≥qi∗
(
−qi∗ y
∗
4
+
(
1
4
qi∗ +
1
2
)
y∗
z∗
z∗ − y∗
)
=− qi∗y∗/2,
which is strictly positive. Therefore, if agent i′ is not allocated, or if she is tied with some other
agent (in which case she gets zero utility given Lemma 8), or if she is allocated and gets utility
lower than −qi∗y∗/2, she will have an incentive to report agent i∗’s type and get a higher expected
utility. This violates IC, therefore, agent i′ must be assigned the resource with probability one,
and let (zi′ , yi′) be the two-part payment that she is charged. For (wi, pi) types, we know that
for all z ≥ 0, the social surplus is fixed and is equal to the sum of agent’s expected utility and
mechanism’s expected revenue:
swi(z) = wi′pi′ = ui′(zi′)− yi′ + rev i′(zi′ , yi′)
As a result, ui′(zi′) − yi′ ≥ −qi∗y∗/2 implies that rev i′(zi′ , yi′) ≤ wi′pi′ + qi∗y∗/2 = −qi∗y∗/4 +
qi∗y
∗/2 < 0. This violates ND, thus we conclude y∗ ≥ 0 must hold.
Part (ii): y∗ ≥ −z∗. Given part (i), we know that if z∗ ≥ 0, y∗ ≥ 0 ≥ −z∗ must hold. Therefore, we
only need to show that when an allocated agent i∗ is charged (y∗, z∗) where z∗ < 0 and y∗ < −z∗,
then there is a contradiction. Similar to the previous case, we need to analyze whether agent i∗
is tied with any other agent. If i∗ is tied, i.e. allocated with probability qi∗ < 1, she cannot get
positive utility according to Lemma 8. However, with z∗ < 0 and y∗ < −z∗, the agent’s expected
utility is positive (since Lemma 6 implies that ui∗(z
∗)− y∗ ≥ −z∗ − y∗ > 0).
Therefore, the only case to consider is that agent i∗ is allocated the resource with probability
one. In this case, y∗ ≤ 0 cannot hold without violating ND, therefore, the two-part payment
(z∗, y∗) charged must be as shown in Figure 14b. Consider now an agent with value Vi′ that follows
the (wi, pi) type, where wi′ > (−z∗) and pi′ ∈ (0, 1 + y∗/z∗). Given y∗ < −z∗, we know that
1 + y∗/z∗ ∈ (0, 1). With the same analysis as above, we know that when z > −wi′ , the zero-profit
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and budget balanced curves for agent i′ are as shown in Figure 14b. The utility for agent i′ if
allocated and charged (z∗, y∗) is
ui′(z
∗)− y∗ = wi′pi′ − (1− pi′)z∗ − y∗ = wi′pi′ + pi′z∗ + (−z∗ − y∗) > 0,
thus in the economy where agent i∗ is replaced by agent i′, agent i′ has to be allocated and cannot
tie with any other agent (otherwise she gets zero utility given Lemma 8, thus has a useful deviation).
However, since the agent’s utility and the mechanism’s revenue add up to wi′pi′ , the mechanism’s
revenue is upper bounded by −pi′z∗ + (z∗ + y∗) < (1− (1 + y∗/z∗))z∗ + y∗ = 0, which contradicts
ND. Therefore, we conclude that y∗ ≥ −z∗ holds, and this completes the proof of the lemma.
B.4.1 Proof of Lemma 4
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4, which characterizes the set of possible outcomes under any
mechanism that satisfies (P1)-(P6).
Lemma 4. Assume that the type space includes all value distributions satisfying (A1)-(A3), and
consider a two-period mechanism that satisfies (P1)-(P6). For any type profile F , the allocated
agent i∗ and the two-part payment (z∗, y∗) agent i∗ is charged satisfy:
(i) (z∗, y∗) resides weakly below ui∗(z).
(ii) (z∗, y∗) resides weakly above the frontier of the rest of the economy uN\{i∗}(z).
(iii) The allocated agent faces a non-negative base payment y∗ ≥ 0.
Proof. Part (i) is implied by IR. We have already proved part (iii) in Lemma 9. For part (ii), we
show that if exists agent i′ 6= i∗ s.t. ui′(z∗) − y∗ > 0, then there is a contradiction. To simplify
notation, consider a type profile F = (F1, . . . , Fn), where agent i
∗ = 1 is allocated with non-zero
probability, and assume that agent 2 has u2(z
∗) − y∗ > 0. Now consider agent 1′, whose type is
identical to that of agent 2: F1′ = F2. For economy (F1′ , F−1), given anonymity, we know that one
of the following two situations must be true: case (1), neither of agent 1′ or 2 ever gets allocated,
in which case they both get zero utilities; case (2), both agents 1′ and 2 are allocated with some
probability less than one (given that have the same DSE bids and the mechanism is anonymous),
in which case Lemma 8 implies that it is also the case that they both get zero utility. As a result,
each of them has a useful deviation, which is to report as if her type was Fi, get allocated, and get
strictly positive utility. This contradicts DSE, and completes the proof of this lemma.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5. Fix any type profile F satisfying (A1) and (A2). Among all mechanisms that satisfy
(P1)-(P6), the utilization achieved by a mechanism is (weakly) higher if it charges its allocated
agent(s) a higher penalty z∗. Similarly, the achieved welfare is monotonically increasing in z∗ when
z∗ ≤W , and monotonically decreasing in z∗ when z∗ > W .
Proof. For any economy, and any mechanism that satisfies (P1)-(P6), if there is a single agent that
gets allocated, the agent has to be charged a two-part payment (z∗, y∗) for some z∗. If more than
one agents are tied, i.e. submitted the same reports, then anonymity requires that they are charged
the same two-part payment (z∗, y∗). Therefore, for each economy, each mechanism that satisfies
(P1)-(P6) charges the allocated agent(s) a penalty z∗. We know from Lemma 4 that when the
penalty is z∗, the allocated agent(s) must reside on the frontier of the economy at penalty z∗.
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Now consider an economy, and two mechanisms M1 and M2 both satisfying (P1)-(P6), which
charge the allocated agents penalties z∗1 and z∗2 respectively, and assume without loss that z∗1 < z∗2 .
Let N1 , arg maxi∈N ui(z∗1) and let N2 , arg maxi∈N ui(z∗2), i.e. the sets of agents that might be
allocated in the two mechanisms. Let i∗1 ∈ arg maxi∈N1 uti(z∗1), and i∗2 ∈ arg mini∈N2 uti(z∗2), we
know that regardless of how the mechanism breaks ties, the the utilization achieved byM1 is upper
bounded by uti∗1(z
∗
1), and that the utilization achieved by M2 is lower bounded by uti∗2(z∗2). Now
consider two cases. If i∗1 = i∗2, uti∗1(z
∗
1) ≤ uti∗2(z∗2) is implied by Lemma 2. If i∗1 6= i∗2, we know that
ui∗1(z
∗
1) ≥ ui∗2(z∗1) and ui∗1(z∗2) ≤ ui∗2(z∗2) hold. In this case, Lemma 3 implies that uti∗1(z∗1) ≤ uti∗2(z∗2)
holds. This completes the proof that M2 achieves (weakly) higher utilization than M1.
For the monotonicity properties of social welfare, when z∗1 < z∗2 ≤W , let i∗1 ∈ arg maxi∈N1 swi(z∗1),
and i∗2 ∈ arg mini∈N2 swi(z∗2), then apply Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we know that regardless of
whether i∗1 = i∗2, M2 achieves weakly better welfare than swi∗2(z∗2), which is weakly higher than
swi∗1(z
∗
1), which is an upper bound on welfare achieved by M1. The monotonicity of welfare can
be proved similarly for the case when W ≤ z∗1 < z∗2 . This completes the proof of this lemma.
B.6 Optimality of CP(W )
B.6.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. Assume the type space is the set of all value distributions satisfying (A1) and (A2).
With the generic input assumption, no two-period mechanism under (P1)-(P6) achieves weakly
higher social welfare than the CP(W ) mechanism for all type profiles, and a strictly higher social
welfare than the CP(W ) mechanism for at least one type profile.
Proof. Assume that there is a mechanism M satisfying (P1)-(P6) s.t. the social welfare under M
is always as good as that under CP(W ) for every type profile F that satisfy (A1)-(A2). We show
that M either has the same outcome as in CP(W ), or achieve the same social welfare.
Assume w.l.o.g that agent 1 is allocated under CP(W ) given some type profile F , and let
(z∗, y∗) be her two-part payment under CP(W ). For the case when maxi 6=1 ui(W ) ≥ 0, we know
that u1(W ) > 0, and that z
∗ = W under CP(W ), and this outcome is already welfare-optimal.
Thus M cannot achieve higher social welfare, therefore what is left to consider is the case where
ui(W ) < 0 for all i 6= 1. Assume w.l.o.g. that z02 = maxi 6=1 z0i and that z02 < W . The generic input
assumption implies that z02 < z
0
1 .
We now show that M must also allocate the resource to agent 1 in order to achieve weakly
higher social welfare than the CP(W ) mechanism. First, M must allocate the resource to some
agent, otherwise it achieves worse welfare. The monotonicity property in Lemma 5 requires that
M charges the allocated agent a penalty weakly higher than z∗ = z02 . Since the base payment y∗
cannot be smaller than zero, the only agents that found a penalty of z02 or higher acceptable are
agents 1 and agent 2. Allocating to agent 2 at penalty z02 is not possible, since this violates part
(ii) of Lemma 4. Therefore, agent 1 must still be allocated under M.
If the penalty charged by mechanismM is also z02 , then the outcome coincides with that under
CP(W ). Therefore, the only case to consider is when M charges agent 1 a two-part payment
(z′, y′) where z′ > z02 . Part (iii) of Lemma 4 requires that y′ ≥ 0, thus we have u2(z′) − y′ < 0.
See Figure 15. Define ε , u1(z02) − (u1(z′) − y′). We know from the monotonicity of u1(z) that
ε ≥ y′ ≥ 0. If ε = 0, it must be the case that u1(z02) = u1(z′) since y′ is non-negative, in which case
u1(z) is flat in this range, and as a result the right derivative of u1(z) is zero. From Lemma 2, we
know that P
[
V1 ≥ −z02
]
= P [V1 ≥ −z′] = 1, and M achieves the same welfare and utilization as
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Figure 16: Illustration for the proof of Lemma 10.
the CP(W ) mechanism. Therefore, what is left to consider the case where ε > 0. Let u1′(z) be
u1′(z) , max{u1(z)− (u1(z′)− y′)− ε/2, − z}, ∀z ∈ R.
See Figure 15. For z = z02 , u1′(z
0
2) = u1(z
0
2) − (u1(z′) − y′) − ε/2 = ε − ε/2 = ε/2 > 0, therefore,
u1′(0) ≥ u1′(z02) > 0. We know from Lemma 7 that u1′(z) is the expected utility function of some
type that satisfies (A1)-(A2). Let’s call this agent 1′, and we know that her zero-crossing satisfies
z01′ > z
0
2 . In the original economy, if we replace agent 1 with agent 1
′, agent 1′ will be selected by
mechanism M as well, since M must allocate to the CP(W ) winner. The two-part payment that
agent 1′ faces, which we denote as (z′′, y′′), must satisfy z′′ ≥ z02 , and that u1′(z′′)−y′′ ≥ 0, in order
to achieve welfare as high as the CP(W ) mechanism and not violate IR. For z′′ ≥ z02 , we know
u1(z
′′) = u1′(z′′) + (u1(z′) − y′) + ε/2. Given the construction of u1′(z), we know that if agent 1
reports the type of agent 1′, she will get allocated under mechanism M, charged (z′′, y′′), and get
expected utility
u1(z
′′)− y′′ = u1′(z′′) + (u1(z′)− y′) + ε/2− y′′ > u1(z′)− y′.
This is a useful deviation for agent 1 under M, therefore mechanism M cannot strictly dominate
the CP(W ) mechanism in welfare, and this completes the proof of this theorem.
B.6.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Before proving the theorem, we first provide the following lemma on the ordered payment space.
Lemma 10. Assume that the type space includes all (wi, pi) types. Let (z, y) and (z˜, y˜) be two sets
of two-part payment in the same ordered payment space. It cannot be the case that 0 < y−y˜ < z˜−z.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction, that there exists an ordered payment space P, and two-
part payments (z, y), (z˜, y˜) ∈ P s.t. 0 < y − y˜ < z˜ − z, as illustrated in Figure 16. Denote
q = 1 − (y − y˜)/(z˜ − z), we know that q ∈ (0, 1). Now consider two (wi, pi) types, with w1, w2 >
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max{−z,−z˜, 0}, and with p1 = q/2, and p2 = q/2 + 1/2. We know that 0 < p1 < q < p2 < 1, and
that (w1, p1) and (w2, p2) are both valid parameters of (wi, pi) types. Moreover:
u1(z)− y − (u1(z˜)− y˜) = −(1− p1)(z − z˜)− y + y˜ > −(1− q)(z − z˜)− y + y˜ = 0,
u2(z)− y − (u2(z˜)− y˜) = −(1− p2)(z − z˜)− y + y˜ < −(1− q)(z − z˜)− y + y˜ = 0,
meaning that agents 1 and 2 has different, strict preferences over (z, y) and (z˜, y˜). See Figure 16.
This is a contradiction to the definition of an ordered payment space.
We now prove the optimality result.
Theorem 4. Assume the type space is the set of all value distributions satisfying (A1) and (A2).
With the generic input assumption, the CP(W ) mechanism is welfare-optimal type profile by type
profile, among all two-period mechanisms that satisfy (P1)-(P6), always allocate the resource, and
use an ordered payment space.
Proof. Let M be a mechanism that satisfies (P1)-(P6), always allocates the resource, and uses
an ordered payment space P. We know from Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 that given any economy, if
mechanism M achieves better social welfare than the CP(W ) mechanism, then it must allocate
to the same agent as the CP(W ) mechanism does, and charge a higher penalty than the second
highest zero-crossing. We show a conflict to the ordered payment space if this is the case.
Assume w.l.o.g. that agent 1 is allocated under mechanism M, and assume toward a con-
tradiction, that agent 1 is charged the two part payment (z∗, y∗) with z∗ > z02 = maxi 6=1 z0i , as
illustrated in Figure 17. IfM achieves better welfare, it must be the case that z02 < W . IR requires
that pi , u1(z∗) − y∗ ≥ 0. If u1(z02) = pi + y∗ = u1(z∗), from the convexity of u1(z), we know
that u′1(z+) = 0 for all z ≥ z02 , meaning that P
[
V1 ≥ z02
]
= P [V1 ≥ z∗] = 1, i.e. in comparison
to the CP(W ) mechanism, although M charges a higher penalty, it has no improvement on wel-
fare or utilization. Therefore, we only need to consider the case when u1(z
0
2) > pi + y
∗. Define
ε , pi + (u1(z02)− pi − y∗)/2, we know that ε > pi.
Now consider u1′(z) defined as u1′(z) , max{u1(z)− ε, uN\{1}(z)} for all z ∈ R, as illustrated
in Figure 17. Lemma 7 implies that u1′(z) is the expected utility function of some agent, whose
type, which we denote as F1′ , also satisfies (A1)-(A2). Now consider the economy (F1′ , F−1), and
assume that the allocated agent is charged a two-part payment (z′, y′) in this economy. We need
to consider two cases, depending on whether agent 1′ is allocated.
Case 1: Assume agent 1′ is allocated, in which case u1′(z′) − y′ ≥ 0 given IR. If the payment
(z′, y′) satisfies u1′(z′)− y′ > 0, we know that it cannot be the case that u1′(z′) = uN\{1}(z′). This
is because u1′(z
′) = uN\{1}(z′) implies that uN\{1}(z′)− y′ > 0 holds, and this violates part (ii) of
Lemma 4. As a result, u1′(z
′) = u1(z′)−ε given the construction of u1′(z), and this implies a useful
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deviation for agent 1 in the original economy: if she pretends that her type is actually F1′ , gets
allocated and charged (z′, y′), her utility will be u1(z′)− y′ = u1′(z′) + ε− y′ > ε > pi. As a result,
we must have u1′(z
′) − y′ = 0. We claim that it must also be the case that uN\{1}(z′) − y′ = 0,
since otherwise, it has be the case that uN\{1}(z′)− y′ < 0, which again implies u1′(z′) = u1(z′)− ε
holds, and this also results in a useful deviation for agent 1 in the original economy.
Case 2: If agent 1′ is not allocated in the economy (F1′ , F−1), the payment (z′, y′) satisfies
uN\{1}(z′) − y′ ≥ 0, since some other agent has to be allocated. Part (ii) of Lemma 4 and the
construction of u1′(z) imply that u1′(z
′)− y′ ≤ 0⇒ uN\{1′}(z′)− y′ ≤ 0. As a result, uN\{1′}(z′)−
y′ = 0 holds, which also implies u1′(z′)− y′ = 0, since u1′(z′) ≥ uN\{1′}(z′).
Therefore, for both cases, we know u1′(z
′)− y′ = 0 and uN\{1}(z′)− y′ = 0 both hold, implying
u1′(z
′) = uN\{1}(z′). Given part (iii) of Lemma 4, we know that y′ ≥ 0, therefore z′ ≤ z02 since
otherwise uN\{1}(z′) − y′ < 0. Let zˆ be the unique point where uN\{1′}(zˆ) = y∗. Since y∗ ≥ 0
and z02 < W (which implies uN\{1′}(z02) < 0), we know that zˆ is well defined given Lemma 1 and
Lemma 6, and that zˆ is strictly smaller than z02 . The monotonicity of u1(z) guarantees that for
all z ∈ [zˆ, z02 ], u1(z) ≥ u1(z02), therefore u1′(z) ≥ u1(z) − ε ≥ u1(z02) − pi − (u1(z02) − pi − y∗)/2 =
y∗ + (u1(z02) − pi − y∗)/2 > y∗. As a result, u1′(z) > y∗ ≥ uN\{1′}(z) holds for all z ∈ [zˆ, z02 ], thus
z′ ≥ zˆ violates u1′(z′) = uN\{1}(z′). As a result, we know z′ < zˆ.
We now claim that 0 < y′ − y∗ < z∗ − z′ holds, which violates the ordered payment space
assumption, according to Lemma 10. First, uN\{1}(z′) − y′ = 0, uN\{1}(zˆ) − y∗ = 0 and z′ < zˆ
implies that y′ > y∗. Moreover, uN\{1}(z′)− y′ = 0, uN\{1}(zˆ)− y∗ = 0 and the fact that the slope
of uN\{1}(z) is lower bounded by −1 implies that y′ − y∗ < zˆ − z′ < z02 − z′ < z∗ − z′. Thus we get
0 < y′ − y∗ < z∗ − z′. This completes the proof that no mechanism with the stated properties can
charge the allocated agent a higher penalty the penalty under CP(W ) in any economy and improve
welfare. We thus conclude that the CP(W ) mechanism is welfare-optimal profile by profile.
B.7 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. Assume the type space is the set of all value distributions satisfying (A1)-(A3), assume
generic input, and consider only two-period mechanisms that satisfy (P1)-(P6):
(i) the CSP mechanism is the unique mechanism that always allocates the resource, and does not
charge the allocated agent if the resource is utilized (i.e. “no-charge”).
(ii) for the (wi, pi) type space, the CSP mechanism is optimal for utilization, profile by profile.
(iii) the CSP mechanism is not dominated for utilization by any mechanism.
(iv) the CSP mechanism is utilization optimal profile by profile, among all mechanisms that always
allocate the resource and use an ordered payment space.
Proof. With the generic input assumption, we consider w.l.o.g an economy, where agents are ordered
in decreasing-order in their zero-crossings z01 > z
0
2 > · · · > z0n. Agent 1 is assigned the resource
under CSP, and she is charged penalty z∗ = z02 , and a zero base payment y∗ = 0. A similar analysis
as in the proof of Theorem 3 (see Appendix B.6) shows that the only way to achieve a higher
utilization than the outcome under CSP is to also assign the resource to agent 1, and charge a
penalty that is higher than z02 . This immediately give us part (ii) of this theorem, since for the
(wi, pi) types, a higher penalty does not improve utilization. The exact same construction as in
the proof of Theorem 3 shows that charging a higher penalty results in a violation of one of DSE,
IR or ND, unless the mechanism charges a smaller penalty than CSP does in some other economy.
Therefore the CSP is not dominated in utilization by any mechanism, which is part (iii).
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Figure 18: Social welfare and utilization for a single resource, with small societal value W = 0.
We now prove part (i) of this theorem. From Lemma 4 and the “no charge” assumption, we
know that for any type profile F , the payment two-part (z∗, y∗) facing the allocated agent i∗ facing
the allocated agent i∗ must satisfy y∗ = 0 and z∗ ∈ [z02 , z01 ]. The only agents that can be allocated
are agents 1 and 2, without violating IR. Allocating to agent 2 violates part (ii) of Lemma 4,
therefore agent 1 is allocated. We now argue z∗ = z02 must hold, and thus the CSP outcome.
Assume otherwise, that there exist a mechanismM and an economy where and z∗ > z02 . Consider
the economy in which agent 1 is replaced by agent 1′ with zero-crossing z01′ ∈ (z02 , z∗). Agent 1′
must be allocated from the above argument and the requirement that the resource is allocated, thus
the penalty that she faces z′ must be smaller than z∗ (otherwise IR is violated). This gives agent 1
in the original economy a useful deviation, which is to report the type of agent 1′, getting allocated
and charged a smaller penalty. This is a contradiction, and therefore proves the uniqueness of CSP.
Part (iv) can be proved by the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4: if a mechanism
charges the allocated agent a two-part payment (z∗, y∗) with z∗ > z02 and improves utilization,
then we can construct an alternative economy, where the new payment (z′, y′) collected by the
mechanism cannot reside in the same ordered payment space together with (z∗, y∗).
C Additional Simulation Results
For the assignment of a single resource, the value for each agent to use the resource is Vi = wi−Oi,
where Oi is the random opportunity cost with exponential distribution parametrized by λi. For
uniform distribution of the opportunity cost λ−1i ∼ U[0, 10] and random distribution of the value
wi ∼ U[0, λ−1i ], we examined the setting when W = 5 is equal to the average opportunity cost.
For the scenario where W = 0, meaning that the society does not care about whether the
resource is utilized, the average welfare and utilization achieved by the mechanisms are as shown
in Figure 18. The generalized CP(0) mechanism coincides with the second price auction, and both
achieve the first-best social welfare. The CSP mechanism has higher utilization, but achieves lower
welfare, since when the society does not value utilization, incentivizing agents to use the resource
when they naturally would not hurts the welfare.
For the setting where W = 10, modeling the scenario where the society have a stronger prefer-
ence for the resource being utilized, the average welfare and utilization under different mechanisms
for 10,000 randomly generated economies are as shown in Figure 19. Figure 19a shows that when
the societal value W is higher, the CP(W ) mechanism achieves a much higher social welfare than
the SP mechanism. The CP(W ) and CSP social welfare coincide since when W is high, no agent
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Figure 19: Social welfare and utilization for a single resource, with large societal value W = 10.
is willing to accept W as a period 1 penalty thus the outcomes under the two mechanisms are
the same. Their performance is competitive to the first-best benchmark under IR and ND, espe-
cially when the number of agents is large. Figure 19b presents the average utilization under these
mechanisms. CP(W ) and CSP coincide, and both achieve much higher utilization than SP.
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